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Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG. 108-678 

Efforts To Determine The Status 





JANUARY 28, 2004 

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S. Hrg. 108-678 


Y 4.AR 5/3:S.HRG. 108-678 

Efforts To Determine The Status 





JANUAEY 28, 2004 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 


JAN 1 4 



96-675 PDF 


For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 

Internet: Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 

Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 


JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri 
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina 

Virginia, Chairman 
CARL LEVIN, Michigan 
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 
JACK REED, Rhode Island 
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 
EVAN BAYH, Indiana 
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director 
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director 




Efforts to Determine the Status of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction 
AND Related Programs 

JANUARY 28, 2004 


Kay, Dr. David, Former Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence 
on Strategy Regarding Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs 




U.S. Senate, 
Committee on Armed Services, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:05 a.m., in room 
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner 
(chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Warner, McCain, Inhofe, 
Roberts, Allard, Sessions, Colhns, Ensign, Dole, Cornyn, Levin, 
Kennedy, B3rrd, Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, 
Dayton, Bayh, Clinton, and Pryor. 

Committee staff members present: Judith A. Ansley, staff direc- 
tor; and Gabriella Eisen, nominations clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup, professional 
staff member; L. David Cherington, counsel; Regina A. Dubey, re- 
search assistant; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; 
Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member; Lucian L. Nie- 
meyer, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional 
staff member; Scott W. Stucky, general counsel; and Richard F. 
Walsh, counsel. 

Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic 
staff director; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Rich- 
ard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Maren R. Leed, pro- 
fessional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, minority counsel; Peter 
K. Levine, minority counsel; and William G.P. Monahan, minority 

Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Leah C. Brewer, An- 
drew W. Florell, and Nicholas W. West. 

Committee members' assistants present: John A. Bonsell, assist- 
ant to Senator Inhofe; James Beauchamp, assistant to Senator 
Roberts; Jayson Roehl, assistant to Senator Allard; Arch Galloway 
II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Derek J. Maurer, assistant to 
Senator Collins; D'Arcy Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign; 
Lindsey R. Neas, assistant to Senator Talent; Clyde A. Taylor IV, 
assistant to Senator Chambliss; Christine O. Hill, assistant to Sen- 
ator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; 
Mieke Y. Eoyang, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Christina Evans 
and Terrence E. Sauvain, assistants to Senator Bjrrd; Elizabeth 
King, assistant to Senator Reed; Caroline Tess, assistant to Sen- 
ator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator E. Benjamin Nel- 


son; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, 
assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze, assistant to Senator 


Chairman Warner. The committee meets today to review a far- 
ther report, and I stress a further report, from Dr. David Kay on 
his efforts and the efforts of the team which he was privileged to 
work with, known as the Iraq Survey Group (ISG). He served as 
the special advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in 
determining the status of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 
related programs in Iraq. 

After assuming this position last July, Dr. Kay made his initial 
interim official report to this committee on October 3. As members 
of the committee are aware, Dr. Kay has stepped down from this 
position and has been succeeded by Charles A. Duelfer, a former 
colleague and member of the U.N. Special Commission with Dr. 
Kay, who has been appointed by Director Tenet to continue this 
important mission. I met with Mr. Duelfer the day before yesterday 
and we just momentarily met with him in the Intelligence Commit- 
tee room. 

Dr. Kay volunteered, and I emphasize that, volunteered to re- 
sume his public service, worked diligently for 6 months in Iraq 
under difficult and often dangerous conditions, and just concluded 
his work last week and reported to the DCI. I thank you and I 
thank your wife for your public service. 

Working with General Dajrton and the ISG, your mission was to 
search for all facts, I repeat all facts, relevant to the many issues 
about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and related programs. You 
initiated what was and continues, I emphasize continues, to be a 
very difficult, complex mission, that in your own words is yet to be 

As you cautioned us when you took up this post in July, patience 
is required to ensure we complete a thorough assessment of this 
important issue. In this hearing today, we hope to receive your as- 
sessment of what has been accomplished to date, I repeat to date, 
and what, in your professional judgment remains to be done by the 
ISG. It is far too early to reach any final judgments or conclusions. 

In recent days, I mentioned I met with General Dayton, I met 
extensively with Dr. Kay over the recess period, and Mr. Duelfer, 
and have received the assurances of General Dayton and Mr. 
Duelfer that they will be prepared to present to Congress a second 
official interim report of the ISG in the timeframe of late March. 

It is crucial that the important work of the ISG go on. Thus far, 
the findings have been significant. Dr. Kay has stated that al- 
though we've not found evidence of large stockpiles of WMD or for- 
ward-deployed weapons, the ISG has made the following evidence 
as a part of their record that will be forthcoming: first, evidence of 
Saddam Hussein's intent to pursue WMD programs on a large 
scale; actual, ongoing chemical and biological research programs; 
an active program to use the deadly chemical ricin as a weapon, 
a program that was interrupted only by the start of the war in 
March; evidence of long-range missile programs that, in all prob- 

ability, were ultimately going to be used to deliver WMD; evidence 
that Saddam Hussein was attempting to reconstitute his fledgling 
nuclear program as late as 2001; and most important, evidence 
that clearly indicates Saddam Hussein was conducting a wide 
range of activities in clear contravention of the United Nations' res- 

As you recently stated, Dr. Kay, and I quote you, "It was reason- 
able to conclude that Iraq posed an imminent threat. What we 
learned during the inspection made Iraq a more dangerous place 
potentially than in fact we thought it was even before the war." 
Further, you said on NBC's Today show on Tuesday that it was 
"absolutely prudent for the U.S. to go to war." 

Dr. Kay, I concur in those conclusions. I believe a real and grow- 
ing threat has been eliminated and a coalition of nations acted pru- 
dently in the cause of freedom. I'd be interested if you concur in 
my conclusions. 

While some have asserted that the President and his senior advi- 
sors may have exaggerated or manipulated pre-war intelligence on 
Iraq's WMD programs. Dr. Kay reached the following conclusion, 
which I think is different. As you stated recently, "We have to re- 
member that this view of Iraq (pre-war assessment of WMD capa- 
bilities) was held during the Clinton administration and did not 
change in the Bush administration. It is not a political got-you 
issue. Often, estimates are different than reality. The important 
thing is, when they differ, to understand why." 

That's precisely why I called this meeting, Dr. Kay, to continue 
the work of this committee in developing a body of fact from which 
reasonable people at the conclusion of that collection of facts can 
reach their own objective thoughts and conclusions. It's been a dif- 
ficult process, but the ISO work is not completed. 

Now, you have stated that you believe there did not exist large 
stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons, but I hope that you 
will, in your testimony, indicate that since the work is not com- 
pleted, since Iraq is as big as California and Baghdad approximates 
the sprawling territory of Los Angeles, that we could find caches 
and reserves of weapons of mass destruction, chemical or biological, 
or even further evidence about the nuclear program. 

We also would hope that you'd address the question of whether 
or not Saddam Hussein had some kind of "breakout" capability for 
quickly producing chemical or biological weapons, and was this not 
a basis for constituting a conclusion that there was an imminent 
threat from Saddam Hussein and his military. 

Why were the Iraqi WMD records systematically looted or de- 
stroyed, and why do scientists in custody today continue not to be 
forthcoming, if there was nothing to hide or nothing substantial ex- 

The work of the ISG has shown that Saddam Hussein had WMD 
intentions, had WMD programs that did survive, and did outwit for 
12 years the United Nations Security Council and the resolutions, 
indeed, the inspections in large measure. If ultimately the findings 
of the ISG do differ from the pre-war assessments of our Intel- 
ligence Community, differ from assessments of the United Nations, 
differ from assessments of intelligence services of many other na- 
tions, indeed, that is cause for concern. But we are not there yet 

in terms of the totality of fact on which to draw such serious con- 

Today and tomorrow our policymakers must be able to rely on 
the intelligence they are provided. The safety and security of the 
men and women of the Armed Forces are dependent on intel- 
ligence, and indeed, the security of our Nation. So collectively all 
of us, Congress, the executive branch, and other nations, we must 
vigorously continue to pursue the collection of the facts as the ISG 
is doing, and upon that completion, then draw our conclusions and 
take such corrective measures as may be necessary. 

As we speak, over 1,400 individuals, military and civilian, are on 
the ground in Iraq seeking the facts about Iraq's WMD programs. 
I have confidence in the commitment and the ability of General 
Dayton, Mr. Duelfer, your successor, and representatives from our 
coalition partners to complete this mission. They have some of the 
best and brightest of our military and our Intelligence Community 
to complete this task, and Congress has provided the necessary 
means, a very substantial appropriation of recent. We remain com- 
mitted to providing the resources that are necessary for the com- 
pletion of the ISG work. 

Dr. Kay, I thank you for your public service once again. 

Senator Levin. 


Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me join you 
in welcoming Dr. Kay to the hearing and stating our thanks for his 
work on the Iraq Survey Group. 

Dr. Kay's recent reported statements — for example, that the In- 
telligence Community was wrong about there being stockpiles of 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq before the war; that it is the 
Intelligence Community's consensus that the two alleged "biologi- 
cal" trailers were for hydrogen production, not for producing bio- 
logical warfare agents; and that Iraq had not reconstituted its nu- 
clear weapons program — stand in sharp contrast to the statements 
made by the administration before going to war in Iraq. Dr. Kay's 
recent statements raise serious questions about the accuracy and 
objectivity of our intelligence and about the administration's public 
statements before the war that were supposedly based on that in- 

Before the war, the administration, in order to support its deci- 
sion to go to war, made numerous vivid, unqualified statements 
about Iraq having in its possession weapons of mass destruction — 
not "programs," not "program-related activities," and not "inten- 
tions." Actual weapons is what the administration's statements fo- 
cused on. 

For example, on August 26, 2002, Vice President Cheney gave a 
major speech about a threat from Iraq's weapons of mass destruc- 

He asserted the following: "Simply stated, there is no doubt that 
Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no 
doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our 
allies, and against us." 

Vice President Cheney was not talking about programs or inten- 
tions; he was specifically referring to existing weapons that were 
being amassed for use against us. 

Here is what Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said in his testi- 
mony to this committee on September 19, 2002: "Saddam Hussein's 
amassed large, clandestine stockpiles of biological weapons, includ- 
ing anthrax, botulism toxin, possibly smallpox. He's amassed large, 
clandestine stockpiles of chemical weapons, including VX, sarin, 
and mustard gas. 

Notice again, not programs or intentions, it's stockpiles that Sad- 
dam Hussein was said to have amassed. 

On September 27, President Bush said that we must make sure 
that Saddam Hussein, "never has the capacity to use the stockpiles 
of anthrax that we know he has, or YK, the biological weapons 
which he possesses." Notice again, not reference to programs or in- 
tentions. The representation is stockpiles and weapons in the pos- 
session of Saddam Hussein. 

On October 7, 2002, President Bush said that, "It [Iraq] pos- 
sesses and produces chemical and biological weapons." Possesses 
and produces, not programs or intentions. 

On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell spoke at 
the U.N. He said, "We know from sources that a missile brigade 
outside Baghdad was dispersing rocket launchers and warheads 
containing biological warfare agent to various locations. Most of the 
launchers and warheads had been hidden in large groves of palm 
trees — and were to be moved every 1 to 4 weeks to escape detec- 
tion. There can be no doubt," Secretary Powell said, "no doubt that 
Saddam Hussein has biological weapons . . . and he has the ability 
to dispense these lethal poisons and diseases in ways that can 
cause massive death and destruction." 

Secretary Powell talked about "the existence of mobile production 
facilities used to make biological agents." He said that, "We know 
what the tanks, pumps, compressors, and other parts look like. We 
know how they fit together. We know how they work. We know a 
great deal about the platforms on which they are mounted- We 
know that Iraq has at least seven of these mobile biological agent 
production factories." 

Then he said, "Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has 
a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent. 
That is enough to fill 16,000 battlefield rockets." He followed on by 
saying, "Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. . . We have 
sources who tell us that he recently has authorized his field com- 
manders to use them." Secretary Powell, in other words, spoke of 
actual weapons, not about "program-related activities" or "inten- 

On March 11, 2003, just before the start of the war. Secretary 
of Defense Rumsfeld said the following: "We know he continues to 
hide biological and chemical weapons, moving them to different lo- 
cations as often as every 12 to 24 hours and placing them in resi- 
dential neighborhoods." 

About 2 weeks later. Secretary Rumsfeld said, "We know where 
they [weapons of mass destruction] are." 

Just in case there was ever any doubt about the reason given for 
why we went to war, the President's Press Secretary restated the 

point this way on April 10, 2003: "Make no mistake ... we have 
high confidence that they have weapons of mass destruction. That 
is what this war was about and it is about. We have high con- 
fidence it will be found." 

Incredibly enough, administration leaders are still saying that 
we found weapons of mass destruction production facilities. Just 
last week. Vice President Cheney said that the two trailers found 
in Iraq were part of a mobile biological weapons lab program and 
were, in his words, "conclusive evidence that he did in fact have 
programs for weapons of mass destruction." 

But today's witness, Dr. David Kay, is reported in the New York 
Times as sa3dng that the consensus in the Intelligence Community 
is that those two trailers were for producing hydrogen for weather 
balloons or possibly rocket fuel — but not for biological weapons. 

Surely we should find out what is the basis for Vice President 
Cheney's recent statement, as well as the basis for the unqualified 
administration statements made before the war which I have just 

Unfortunately, as of now, the leadership of the Senate will not 
allow an inquiry into how the administration characterized the in- 
telligence about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The Intel- 
ligence Committee's inquiry is limited to the question of the pro- 
duction of intelligence. That committee is not looking into how that 
intelligence was used and characterized by policymakers. 

We will continue to press for an inquiry looking to get the whole 
story, the full picture. If the only way to obtain that is to have an 
outside, independent, nonpartisan commission to conduct a com- 
prehensive and objective review of the entire matter, so be it. 

Whether one agreed or disagreed with the decision to proceed to 
war, and whether one agreed or disagreed with the decision to pro- 
ceed without the support of the international community acting 
through the U.N., the case made by the administration for initiat- 
ing the war against Iraq was not because Iraq had intentions to 
someday resume production of weapons of mass destruction. It was 
because they had in their possession weapons of mass destruction. 

Although the issue of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction inten- 
tions or ambitions and program-related activities is a serious issue, 
it is not why we went to war. The case for war was Iraq's posses- 
sion, production, deployment, and stockpiling of weapons of mass 
destruction. A different case for war against Iraq can be made, but 
the case which the administration made to the American people 
was the presence of actual weapons of mass destruction. 

When lives are at stake and our military is going to be placed 
in harm's way, in other words, when we decide to go to war, it is 
totally unacceptable to have intelligence that is this far off or to ex- 
aggerate or shape the intelligence for any purpose by anybody. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman WARNER. Dr. Kay, we'll now receive from you any pre- 
liminary comments you wish to make. 


Dr. Kay. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As we discussed, 
I do not have a written statement. This hearing came about very 
quickly. I do have a few prehminary comments, but I suspect you're 
more interested in asking questions. I'll be happy to respond to 
those questions to the best of my ability. 

I would like to open by saying that the talent, dedication, and 
bravery of the staff of the ISG that was my privilege to direct is 
unparalleled and the country owes a great debt of gratitude to the 
men and women who have served over there and continue to serve 
doing that. 

A great deal has been accomplished by the team and I do think, 
I echo what you said, Senator, I think it important that it goes on 
and that it is allowed to reach its full conclusion. In fact, I really 
believe it ought to be better resourced and totally focused on WMD, 
that that is important to do it. 

But I also believe that it is time to begin the fundamental analy- 
sis of how we got here, what led us here, and what we need to do 
in order to ensure that we are equipped with the best possible in- 
telligence as we face these issues in the future. 

Let me begin by saying we were almost all wrong, and I certainly 
include myself here. Senator Kennedy knows very directly. Senator 
Kennedy and I talked on several occasions prior to the war that my 
view was that the best evidence that I had seen was that Iraq in- 
deed had weapons of mass destruction. I would also point out that 
many governments that chose not to support this war, certainly the 
French, President Chirac, as I recall, in April of last year referred 
to Iraq's possession of WMD. The Germans, certainly the intel- 
ligence service, believed that there were WMD. 

It turns out we were all wrong probably in my judgment and 
that is most disturbing. We're also in a period in which we've had 
intelligence surprises in the proliferation area that go the other 
way. The case of Iran, a nuclear program that the Iranians had 
was 18 years old, that we underestimated, and that in fact we 
didn't discover. It was discovered by a group of Iranian dissidents 
outside the country who pointed their national community to the 
location. The Libyan program recently discovered was far more ex- 
tensive than was assessed prior to that. 

There's a long record here of being wrong. There's a good reason 
for it, there are probably multiple reasons. Certainly proliferation 
is a hard thing to track, particularly in countries that deny easy 
and free access and don't have free and open societies. 

In my judgment, based on the work that has been done to this 
point by the ISG, in fact that I reported to you in October, Iraq was 
in clear violation of the terms of Resolution 1441. Resolution 1441 
required that Iraq report all of its activities, one last chance to 
come clean about what it had. We have discovered hundreds of 
cases based on both documents, physical evidence, and the testi- 
mony of Iraqis of activities that were prohibited under the initial 
U.N. Resolution 687 and that should have been reported under 
Resolution 1441 with Iraqi testimony that not only did they not tell 


the U.N. about this, they were instructed not to do it and they hid 

I think the aim, and certainly the aim of what I've tried to do 
since leaving, is not political and certainly not a witch hunt at indi- 
viduals. It's to try to direct our attention at what I believe is a fun- 
damental fault analysis that we must now examine. 

Let me take one of the explanations most commonly given: Ana- 
lysts were pressured to reach conclusions that would fit the politi- 
cal agenda of one or another administration. I deeply think that is 
a wrong explanation. As a leader of the effort of the ISG, I spent 
most of my days not out in the field leading inspections, it's typi- 
cally what you do at that level. I was trying to motivate, direct, 
find strategies. 

In the course of doing that, I had innumerable analysts who 
came to me in apology that the world that we were finding was not 
the world that they had thought existed and that they had esti- 
mated. Reality on the ground differed in advance and never, not in 
a single case, was the explanation, I was pressured to do this. The 
explanation was very often, the limited data we had led one to rea- 
sonably conclude this, I now see that there's another explanation 
for it. 

Each case was different but the conversations were sufficiently 
in depth and our relationship was sufficiently frank that I am con- 
vinced that at least of the analysts I dealt with, I did not come 
across a single one that felt it had been, in the military term, inap- 
propriate command influence that led them to take that position. 
It was not that. It was the honest difficulty based on the informa- 
tion that had been collected and led the analyst to that conclusion. 

Almost in a perverse way, I wish it had been undue influence, 
because we know how to correct that. We get rid of the people who 
in fact were exercising that. The fact that it wasn't tells me that 
we have a much more fundamental problem of understanding what 
went wrong and we have to figure out what was there. That's what 
I call fundamental fault analysis. 

Like I say, I think we have other cases other than Iraq. I do not 
think the problem of global proliferation of weapons technology of 
mass destruction is going to go away and that's why I think it is 
an urgent issue. 

Let me wrap up here with just a brief summary of what I think 
we are now facing in Iraq. I regret to say that I think at the end 
of the work of the ISG there is still going to be an unresolvable am- 
biguity about what happened. A lot of that traces to the failure on 
April 9 to establish immediately physical security in Iraq, the un- 
paralleled looting and destruction, a lot of which was directly inten- 
tional, designed by the security services to cover the tracks of the 
Iraq WMD program and their other programs as well, a lot of 
which was what we simply called "Ali Baba" looting. "It had been 
the regime, the regime is gone, I'm going to go take the gold toilet 
fixtures and everything else imaginable." I've seen looting around 
the world and thought I knew the best looters in the world. The 
Iraqis excel at that. 

The result is — and document destruction — we're really not going 
to be able to prove beyond a truth the negatives and some of the 
positive conclusions that we're going to come to. There will be al- 

ways unresolved ambiguity here. But I do think the ISG, I think 
Charlie Duelfer is a great leader, I have utmost confidence in 
Charles, I think you will get as fiill an answer as you can possibly 

Let me just conclude by my own personal tribute, both to the 
President and to George Tenet for having the courage to select me 
to do this and my successor, Charlie Duelfer, as well. Both of us 
are known for what is, at times, a regrettable strength — a streak 
of independence. I came not from within the administration and it 
was clear and clear in our discussions and no one asked otherwise, 
that I would lead this the way I thought best and I would speak 
the truth as we found it. I had absolutely no pressure prior, during 
the course of the work at the ISG, or after I left to do an3d;hing oth- 
erwise. I think that shows a level of maturity and understanding 
that I think bodes well for getting to the bottom of this. 

But it is really up to you and your staff on behalf of the Amer- 
ican people to take on that challenge. It's not something that any- 
one from the outside can do, so I look forward to these hearings 
and other hearings and how you will get to the conclusions. 

I do believe we have to understand why reality turned out to be 
different than expectations and estimate. But you have more public 
service, certainly many of you than I have ever had and you recog- 
nize that this is not unusual. I told Senator Warner earlier that 
I've been drawn back as a result of a recent film of reminding me 
of something. At the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the combined 
estimate — there was unanimity in the intelligence service — was 
that there were no Soviet warheads in Cuba at the time of the mis- 
sile crisis. Fortunately, President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy 
disagreed with the estimate and chose a course of action less ambi- 
tious and aggressive than recommended by their advisors. 

But the most important thing about that story, which is not often 
told, is that as a result after the Cuban missile crisis, immediate 
steps were taken to correct our inability to collect intelligence on 
the movement of nuclear material out of the Soviet Union to other 
places, so that by the end of the Johnson administration, the Intel- 
ligence Community had a capability to do what it had not been 
able to do at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. 

I think you face a similar responsibility in ensuring that the 
community is able to do a better job in the future than it has done 
in the past. 

Senator, I'm happy to answer your questions. 

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much. Colleagues, we'll go 
to a round of 6 minutes. In the event there's a vote, it's my inten- 
tion to continue the hearing on a rotation basis as members come 
and go so we have continuity. 

Doctor, I assure you that Congress, this committee, the Intel- 
ligence Committee under Senator Roberts, Senator Rockefeller, 
that Senator Levin and I will pursue this, but we'll wait until such 
time as the work of the Intelligence Committee — we both serve on 
that committee — is completed, we've had a chance to analyze it, 
and then we'll sit down to determine what the next step may be. 

But bottom line, and you have emphasized it, and that is that 
we have to make such corrections as we deem necessary to the in- 
telligence system, for the security of this country, for the safety of 


the men and women in uniform who today and tonight and tomor- 
row and for the definite future will be out there taking risks in the 
cause of freedom. So I assure you it will be done. 

Now, I want to pick up on your comment that we were all wrong. 
Let's stop to think about that. We agreed, you and I, we've had ex- 
tensive discussions, that the work of the ISG has to continue, cor- 

Dr. Kay. Absolutely. 

Chairman Warner. That given the size of Iraq, California, the 
size of Baghdad, Los Angeles, we could discover some facts that 
would confirm the conclusions that were reached by the Intel- 
ligence Community, not only in this country but other nations in 
the future. Am I not correct in that assumption? 

Dr. Kay. I certainly think that's a theoretical possibility, yes. 
Senator Warner. 

Chairman Warner. So maybe we better not pronounce we're all 
wrong yet, because I think until we have finished the work, the 
ISG and the other nations that are working for the ISG, I think 
we better hold such conclusion in abeyance. That would be my 

Dr. Kay. Senator Warner, may I only add, it would be totally out 
of character for me to be against continued investigation in almost 
any area, that's my life. I believe that the effort that has been di- 
rected to this point has been sufficiently intense that it is highly 
unlikely that there were large stockpiles of deployed, militarized 
chemical and biological weapons there. Is it theoretically possible 
in a country as vast as that that they've hidden? It's theoretically 
possible, but we went after this not in the way of trying to find 
where the weapons are hidden. When you don't find them in the 
obvious places, you look to see were they produced, were there peo- 
ple that produced them, were there the inputs to the production 

You do that and you eliminate, and that's what I mean by unre- 
solved ambiguity. When the ISG wraps up its work, whether it be 
6 months or 6 years from now, there are still going to be people 
who say, you didn't look everjrwhere, isn't it possible it was hidden 
someplace? The answer has to be honestly, yes, it's possible, but 
you try to eliminate that by this other process, and when I reached 
the conclusion, which I admit is partial and is purely mine that I 
think there were no large stockpiles of WMD, it's based on that 
process. But I agree, we're not in disagreement at all. The search 
must continue. 

Chairman Warner. Right. But the operative word in your as- 
sumption is large. Several small caches could constitute an immi- 
nent threat. Am I not correct in that? 

Dr. Kay. That's always possible and I doubt that we will ever — 
I mean, it's possible — they could be there and we could never find 

Chairman WARNER. All right. But let's give this process a chance 
to continue. 

Dr. Kay. Absolutely. 

Chairman Warner. We agree that there could be the discovery 
in some future date of the evidence which confirms, perhaps not in 


totality, but in part, the conclusions of the international intel- 
ligence community, so we leave open that option. 

But let's go back to your other statement that you feel that per- 
haps as much as 85 percent of the work of the ISG has been com- 
pleted. Am I correct in that? 

Dr. Kay. I've said I think 85 percent of the major elements of the 
Iraqi program are probably known. That's not 85 percent of the 
total volume. 

Chairman Warner. But in our discussions you've emphasized 
that 15 percent yet to be done could yield productive evidence 
that's just as important to what you've accumulated or not accumu- 
lated to date. 

Dr. Kay. Senator Warner, that's certainly true, particularly with 
regard to the foreign countries and individuals that assisted that 
program, which remain a continuing threat in other countries un- 
less we know fully who they were and what they contributed. 

Chairman Warner. Clearly that at the outbreak of the war or 
prior thereto and during the war, an awful lot of destruction of doc- 
uments took place and perhaps other tangible evidence. Today the 
persons who were most likely involved in weapons programs, most 
likely to have the knowledge, are refusing to talk. Does that not 
lend itself to an assumption that there had to be something there, 
otherwise they wouldn't have gone about, so methodically destroy- 
ing all the records and refusing to talk? 

Dr. Kay. You're absolutely — I think, and I think I've said, but let 
me be absolutely clear about it, Iraq was in clear and material vio- 
lation of Resolution 1441. They maintained programs and activities 
and certainly they had the intentions at a point to resume their 
programs, so there was a lot they wanted to hide because it showed 
what they were doing that was illegal. I hope we find even more 
evidence of that. 

Chairman Warner. Part of that program was missiles clearly, 
clearly in defiance of the U.N. resolution in terms of range. They 
had the potential to incorporate in those warheads, although small 
quantities, nevertheless very lethal types of WMD. Am I not correct 
in that? 

Dr. Kay. You're absolutely correct. 

Chairman Warner. Could you say that the work thus far of the 
ISG, and I recounted a number of things including the ricin and 
so forth in my opening statement, does not that lend itself to the 
understanding, the conclusion that Saddam Hussein and this mili- 
tary machine under his control posed an imminent threat, perhaps 
to the neighbors, perhaps to those beyond the perimeter of the 

Dr. Kay. Senator Warner, I think the world is far safer with the 
disappearance and the removal of Saddam Hussein. I have said I 
actually think this may be one of those cases where it was even 
more dangerous than we thought. I think when we have the com- 
plete record, you're going to discover that after 1998 it became a 
regime that was totally corrupt, individuals were out for their own 
protection, and in a world where we know others are seeking 
WMD, the likelihood at some point in the future of a seller and a 
buyer meeting up would have made that a far more dangerous 


country than even we anticipated with what may turn out not to 
be a fully accurate estimate. 

Chairman Warner. Thank you, Dr. Kay. 

Senator Levin. 

Senator Levin. Dr. Kay, on the question of stockpiles, you have 
stated, I believe, that in your opinion, Iraq did not have large 
stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons in 2002. Is that cor- 

Dr. Kay. That's correct, Senator. 

Senator Levin. Do you have any evidence that they had any 
stockpiles, large or small, in 2002? 

Dr. Kay. I simply have no evidence. Senator. 

Senator Levin. You've not uncovered any evidence of small stock- 

Dr. Kay. We have not uncovered any small stockpiles, that's cor- 

Senator Levin. Have you uncovered any evidence that they had 
small stockpiles in 2002? 

Dr. Kay. We have evidence that they certainly could have pro- 
duced small amounts, but we've not discovered evidence of the 

Senator Levin. On the question of the vans, according to the 
New York Times on January 26, you indicated that there's a con- 
sensus in the Intelligence Community that the trailers that we 
found were intended to produce hydrogen for weather balloons or 
possibly rocket fuel, but not for producing biological warfare 
agents. Was that an accurate report of your position? 

Dr. Kay. That's probably not my exact words, but roughly accu- 
rate. I think the consensus opinion is that when you look at those 
two trailers, while they had capabilities in many areas, their actual 
intended use was not for the production of biological weapons. 

Senator Levin. Now, on January 22, just a week ago. Vice Presi- 
dent Cheney said that we know, for example, that prior to our 
going in, he had spent time and effort acquiring mobile biological 
weapons labs and were quite confident he did, in fact, have such 
a program. We found a couple of semi-trailers at this point which 
we believe were in fact part of that program and I would deem that 
"conclusive evidence, if you will, that he did, in fact, have programs 
for weapons of mass destruction." 

Now, those vans, according to the Vice President, 1 week ago are 
conclusive evidence that he had weapons, and yet you're saying 
that the consensus in the Intelligence Community is that those 
vans were for some non-weapons-related purpose, they were either 
for weather balloons, hydrogen, or rocket fuel, but not for weapons 
of mass destruction. 

Do you know what intelligence Vice President Cheney is relying 
on when he tells the public a week ago, not before the war, every- 
one would — they were all wrong before the war — but now, a week 
ago still staying that those vans are conclusive evidence that there 
was a biological weapons program. My question: Do you know what 
intelligence Vice President Cheney was relying on 1 week ago when 
he made that statement to the American public? 


Dr. Kay. Senator Levin, if you want the short answer, and the 
obvious answer, as you probably know, is, am I aware of what the 
Vice President was reading a week ago, I'm not. 

Senator Levin. Have you seen intelhgence which would support 
that conclusion? 

Dr. Kay. Yes, I have. In fact, if you had asked me, as I think in 
fact you did, or members of Senator Roberts' Select Intelligence 
Committee certainly did in July and August, this has been a source 
of real struggle with regard to those vans. There was a point dur- 
ing the process when I would have said the consensus opinion is 
that they were for biological weapons. It's been an ongoing struggle 
to understand those two vans and it's been a shifting target in that 

Senator Levin. Now I understand that shifting target thing. I'm 
talking about right now. You've said that the consensus in the In- 
telligence Community is that those vans are not related. Is that a 
correct statement which you just gave here this morning? Is that 
the consensus opinion in the Intelligence Community now? 

Dr. Kay. It is my view of the consensus opinion, but there are, 
no doubt given the nature of opinions, people out there who hold 
a different opinion. 

Senator Levin. All right. But in your judgment, the consensus in 
the Intelligence Community now is that those are not biological 
weapons vans? 

Dr. Kay. That is my personal judgment. Others may well hold a 
different one. 

Senator Levin. All right. I think it's critically important that we 
find out the basis of the Vice President's statement. I'm sajdng this 
to our chairman, not to you, that we find out the basis of the Vice 
President's statement, because this is where intelligence becomes 
so important. If there's intelligence out there that still supports the 
conclusion with certainty, he deems this conclusive evidence that 
he had programs for weapons of mass destruction. This is a week 

Now, we have to find out what the basis, it seems to me, of that 
statement is. This is the Vice President's statement. I would ask 
the chairman that we ask the Vice President for the basis of that 
statement which he made publicly just about a week ago. 

Senator Roberts. Would the Senator yield on that point? 

Senator Levin. I'd like to first, if I could, just ask our chairman 
whether or not we could ask the Vice President for the basis of that 
statement that was made a week ago? 

Senator Roberts. I think I have an answer for you if you'd yield. 

Senator Levin. I'd like to hear it frankly from the Vice President 
in writing. 

Chairman Warner. We have to continue here, colleagues. I'm 
going to ask the indulgence of the committee while the chair re- 
quests that the committee act on the following list of military nomi- 
nations. A quorum now being present, I ask the committee consider 
a list of 4,763 pending military nominations. The nominations have 
been before the committee the required length of time and no objec- 
tion has been raised regarding them. 

Is there a motion to favorably report the 4,763 nominations to 
the Senate? 


Senator Levin. Support. 

Chairman Warner. Second? All in favor, say aye. 

(A chorus of ayes.) 


(No response.) 

Motion carried. 

Senator Levin. My final question, Dr. Kay, subject to the chair 
perhaps commenting on my request is this: Is it your judgment 
that the aluminum tubes that Iraq was trying to acquire were in- 
tended or used for a centrifuge program to enrich uranium for nu- 
clear weapons? Is that your view? 

Dr. Kay. Senator Levin, this is an area which falls into what 
Senator Warner referred to, where I think it's important that the 
investigation continue. It is my judgment based on the evidence 
that was collected, but there clearly can be more, that it's more 
than probable that those tubes were intended for us in a conven- 
tional missile program rather than in a centrifuge program, but it's 
an open question that's still being investigated. 

Senator Levin. All right. But that is your judgment that they 
were not related to uranium enrichment? 

Dr. Kay. That is my personal judgment that they probably were 
not, based on evidence, but there's still more evidence possible to 

Senator Levin. One short final question, my second final ques- 
tion: In your judgment, had Iraq reconstituted its nuclear weapon 
program in the way you understand the word reconstitute? 

Dr. Kay. It was in the early stages of renovating the program, 
building new buildings. It was not a reconstituted, full-blown nu- 
clear program. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. 

Chairman Warner. Senator, I will take under consideration your 
request. I think Senator Roberts, when it becomes his turn, may 
have a statement that's relevant to it. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Dr. 
Kay, for your service to our country for many years. We're very 
proud to have people like you who are willing to serve the country. 

Dr. Kay, you find yourself today in a very highly charged politi- 
cal environment, and you are by nature a scientist and not one 
who's familiar with these kinds of passions around an election 
year. I think it's important to establish your belief and that of the 
overwhelming body of the intelligence and the Intelligence Commu- 
nity, both here, overseas, and in the Clinton administration, the 
following facts. Saddam Hussein developed and used weapons of 
mass destruction. True? 

Dr. Kay. Absolutely. 

Senator McCain. He used them against the Iranians and the 
Kurds? Just yes or no? 

Dr. Kay. Oh, yes. 

Senator McCain. Okay. You and inspectors found enormous 
quantities of banned chemical and biological weapons in Iraq in the 

Dr. Kay. Yes, sir. 


Senator McCain. We know that Saddam Hussein had once a 
very active nuclear program? 

Dr. Kay. Yes. 

Senator McCain. He realized and had ambitions to develop and 
use weapons of mass destruction? 

Dr. Kay. Clearly. 

Senator McCain. So the point is, if he were in power today, there 
is no doubt that he would harbor ambitions for the development 
and use of weapons of mass destruction. Is there any doubt in your 

Dr. Kay. There's absolutely no doubt, and I think I've said that, 

Senator McCain. Good. But it's important to emphasize this 
point when we look at what has obviously been an intelligence fail- 

Dr. Kay. I agree. 

Senator McCain. When you answered a question from Reuters, 
what happened to the stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons 
that everyone expected to be there, your answer was simple: "I 
don't think they existed." 

So what needs to be established here is that when we — at least 
I hope is your — I believe is your view and certainly mine, that, as 
you just stated, America, the world, and Iraq is a far better and 
safer place with Saddam Hussein gone from power, and the sac- 
rifice made by American citizens and that are serving and sacrific- 
ing today was not only worth it, but very important to the future 
of the Middle East and the world. Do you share that? 

Dr. Kay. That's certainly true, Senator. I've probably learned not 
to speak to wire reporters and even to watch out for Senators who 
want one-word answers. It tends to compress complex issues. 

Senator McCain. But you agree with the fundamental principle 
here that what we did was justified and enhanced the security of 
the United States and the world by removing Saddam Hussein 
from power? 

Dr. Kay. Absolutely. 

Senator McCain. Okay. That's important to establish because 
now in this political season, those are attempted to be mixed, that 
because we didn't find the weapons of mass destruction, therefore, 
the conflict was not justified. That's why I think it's important to 
establish those salient facts. 

But obviously we were wrong, as you said. Now why were we 

Dr. Kay. Senator, I wouldn't pretend that I know all the answers 
or even know all the questions to get at that. I am convinced that 
that is the important forefront of the inquiry that quite frankly you 
must undertake. I have hypotheses of where I think things generi- 
cally have occurred. I think we became almost addicted to the in- 
credible amount of effort that United Nations Special Commission 
(UNSCOM) and U.N. inspectors could produce on the scene and 
that flow of information 

Senator McCain. Including intelligence gained by the previous 

Dr. Kay. That's correct. Did not develop our own human intel- 
ligence (HUMINT) sources there. Now, this really goes back, quite 


frankly, the change took place if you look at it, it goes back to the 
Carter administration when, as a result of things that had occurred 
in the Vietnam area, essentially our HUMINT capability was spun 
down and we got in the habit of relying on intelligence collected by 
liaison services. If a liaison, an individual from another country, 
gets caught as a spy, it doesn't make the front page of The Wash- 
ington Post or The New York Times, it's not politically embarrass- 
ing, and quite frankly, you don't have a dead American, so there 
are good reasons to do it. 

More importantly, and things that I think you have to worry 
about, we have all stressed, why didn't the Intelligence Community 
collect the dots prior to September 11? It all looks clear in retro- 
spect. Quite frankly, the most common problem you have with ana- 
lysts is you do not want them to overanalyze the data. If there are 
only a few dots connected, maybe they don't belong connected. 

I'm convinced in this area, partly because of Iraqi behavior, to a 
large extent because of Iraqi behavior, they cheated, they lied, we 
knew it, UNSCOM, the U.N. had caught them, we got in the habit 
of new pieces of information accreted to this overall consensus view 
without challenging that consensus. 

Senator McCain. Do you believe that those that provided false 
intelligence estimates ought to be held accountable? 

Dr. Kay. Absolutely. 

Senator McCain. Do you believe that we need an independent, 
outside investigation? 

Dr. Kay. Senator 

Senator McCain. You don't have to answer that if you don't 
choose to. Dr. Kay. That's not a fair question. 

Dr. Kay. No, it is really what goes to the heart of the integrity 
of our own process. I generally believe that it's important to ac- 
knowledge failure. I also think we have enough history to under- 
stand that closed orders and secret societies, whether they be reli- 
gious or governmental, are the groups that have the hardest time 
reforming themselves in the face of failure without outside input. 

I must say, my personal view, and it's purely personal, is that 
in this case, you will finally determine that it is going to take an 
outside inquiry both to do it and to give yourself and the American 
people the confidence that you have done it. 

Senator McCain. Not only for what happened in the past, but so 
that we can rely on intelligence in the future. 

Dr. Kay. I would say entirely with regard to the future. Witch 
hunting is not a profitable inquiry. It is for the future that you 
need this. 

Senator McCain. Well, again, every once in a while we get a 
chance to see again someone who has served his country with a 
distinction and honor and courage, and we thank you. Dr. Kay. 

Dr. Kay. Thank you. Senator. 

Chairman Warner. Thank you. Senator McCain. 

Senator Kennedy. 

Senator Kennedy. Thank you. Dr. Kay, and I join in all of those 
that thank you for your service to the country. It is impressive in- 
deed and we thank you for your appearance here before the com- 


Now, the real question, Dr. Kay, is whether there was a greater 
failure than a failure of intelligence. Yesterday you said if anyone 
was abused by the intelligence, it was the President of the United 
States rather than the other way around. But Greg Thielmann, the 
former Director of the Office of Strategic Proliferation and Military 
Affairs in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Re- 
search, stated last July, some of the fault lies with the performance 
of the Intelligence Community, but most of it lies with the way sen- 
ior officials misused the information they were provided. 

He said they surveyed the data, picked out what they liked, the 
whole thing was bizarre. The Secretary of Defense had this huge 
Defense Intelligence Agency and he went around it. In fact, with 
regard to the question of Iraq's chemical weapons program, the De- 
fense Intelligence Agency got it exactly right in September 2002. 
According to the February 2, 2004, edition of the New Republic, an 
agent's report stated there is no reliable information on whether 
Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons or where Iraq 
has or will establish its chemical warfare agent production facili- 
ties. Yet the President told the United Nations in September 2002 
that Iraq likely maintains stockpiles of VX, mustard, and other 
chemical agents. 

The next month, the State Department said that the evidence 
was inadequate to support a judgment that a nuclear program had 
been restarted. It said it was impossible to project a timeline for 
the completion of activities it does not know are happening. Yet in 
an October 7, 2002, speech in Ohio, President Bush said if the Iraqi 
regime is able to produce or steal an amount of highly-enriched 
uranium larger than a single Softball, it could have a nuclear weap- 
on in less than a year. 

Then in September, the Department of Energy had serious con- 
cerns about whether the famous aluminum tubes had an3^hing to 
do with the Iraqis' nuclear programs, yet Secretary Powell used the 
information in his speech before the United Nations. 

In October of last year, the CIA sent two memos to the White 
House voicing strong doubts about the reliability of claims that 
Iraq was trying to obtain nuclear materials from Africa, but the 
President still used the statement in his State of the Union address 
attributed to British intelligence. 

Many of us feel that the evidence so far leads only to one conclu- 
sion, that what has happened was more than a failure of intel- 
ligence, it was the result of manipulation of the intelligence to jus- 
tify a decision to go to war. Now, did you have the access to those 
different intelligence reports as a civilian? 

Dr. Kay. Yes, Senator. I had full access to everj^hing in the In- 
telligence Community with regard to Iraq. 

Senator Kennedy. You had it with regard to the State Depart- 
ment's intelligence and the Department of Energy? 

Dr. Kay. Yes. 

Senator Kennedy. All of those with their conclusions that I've 
read, just summaries of their conclusions? 

Dr. Kay. I had that as well as the individuals. I had on my team 
members of the Department of Energy who had, in fact, partici- 
pated in writing that view. 


Senator Kennedy. Can you give us any explanation of why these 
agencies in retrospect appear to have had it right, and the informa- 
tion that the administration used appeared to have it wrong? What 
weight was given to these reports when you look at them in retro- 
spect, and when you have a number of those that were involved in 
the reports believing that the information reports were used selec- 
tively to justify a policy decision to take the country to war? 

Dr. Kay. Senator Kennedy, it's impossible in the short time I 
have to reply to take you fully through that, and in fact, that's my 
hope that Senator Roberts and his committee will have done that, 
but let me just say that there's a selective process that goes on 
both ways. There were people in the DOE who believe that those 
aluminum tubes were indeed for a centrifuge program. 

It's a lot easier after the fact and after you know the truth to be 
selective that you were right. I've gone through this a lot in my ca- 
reer. All I can say is if you read the total body of intelligence in 
the last 12 to 15 years that flowed on Iraq, I quite frankly think 
it would be hard to come to a conclusion other than Iraq was a 
gathering serious threat to the world with regard to WMD. 

I remind you, it was Secretary Cohen who stood, I think in this 
very committee room, with 5 pounds of flour and talked about an- 

Senator KENNEDY. Just to come back because we have limited 
time — gathering serious threat, you really think that that is — those 
are the words that brought us to war, those were the words that 
justified us going into war, a gathering serious threat? 

Dr. Kay. Senator, that's probably far more in your realm than in 
my realm. I'll take Senator McCain's defense of I being a knave in 
the world of politics. 

Senator KENNEDY. Well, no, I appreciate your response and I ap- 
preciate your appearance here and I think that when we look at 
who has the responsibility, I think it's fair enough to look not only 
what the intelligence, but all the intelligence agencies, and as Sen- 
ator Levin said how that intelligence was used. I think that is 
going to be the key to find out just what representations were 
made and the reasons why they were made, because I think on the 
basis of the information we have now, I think it's difficult to draw 
a conclusion that it was used selectively and in many instances ma- 
nipulated to carry on a policy decision. Thank you. 

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator Kennedy. Colleagues, 
just an administrative announcement. We had scheduled this 
morning a 9:30 hearing on three nominations for the Department 
of Defense. It was my judgment, given the uncertainty of the 
weather, that we could not hold it at 9:30. This committee will 
meet at 4:00 for the purpose of considering the following nominees: 
Mr. Di Rita, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs; Mr. 
Harvey, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Informa- 
tion Integration; and Mr. Chatfield, Director of Selective Service. I 
do hope as many as possible can attend. Thank you very much. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Inhofe. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kay, 
I would repeat ever3^hing that has been said about you and your 
service, and I appreciate it. I appreciate also the private conversa- 
tions we've had and your being very straightforward. 


Just out of curiosity, and this is something you may have a dif- 
ficult time answering because you're trying to get into somebody 
else's mind, but in our conversations when we talked a year ago 
now, a year ago this month, I believe, about the fact that there 
were weapons of mass destruction, we knew he had used weapons 
of mass destruction. Then last week there was an article where you 
were quoted to say that contemporary documents that proved Iraq 
destroyed the weapons of mass destruction in the 1990s. Just out 
of curiosity, do you have any idea why Saddam Hussein did not 
come forth with that evidence when it would have been to his bene- 
fit to do so? 

Dr. Kay. Senator, we've wrestled hours with trying to get an ex- 
planation for Iraqi, and particularly Saddam's, behavior, when in 
fact his rule was at stake, and why he didn't do something else. 
I think most of us come down on two essential issues. He did not 
want to appear to the rest of the Arab world as having caved into 
the U.S. and the U.N., so the creative ambiguity of maintaining 
weapons was important to him and his view of Iraq and particu- 
larly himself and the rest of the world. 

The second is domestic politics. We often forget that he used 
chemical weapons against the Kurds and the Shia and that was a 
continuing threat to him, and he thought that that in fact gave him 
leverage against it. That's our best explanation. 

Senator Inhofe. That's a very good answer. I appreciate that. 
Senator Levin talked about large caches of weapons of mass de- 
struction, and Senator Warner talked about some small ones. I 
think back and I can recall when — and this is about a year ago 
now, it was in January, I believe — that they found 11 chemical 
rockets that had the capabilities of holding 140 liters of something 
like VX gas, which he had used in the past. 

Now, if we found those rockets and they could carry 140 liters 
of VX, which all the professional people in discussing this said 
could kill a million people, why is that not considered a weapon of 
mass destruction? 

Dr. Kay. Well, I think, Senator, the reason — and we actually 
found additional warheads during — the same warheads 

Senator iNHOFE. Some 36 after that, I believe. 

Dr. Kay. Yes, afterwards, is that there was no evidence — look, 
clearly they were in violation not having declared those and turned 
them over, but there was no evidence that the warheads them- 
selves had ever been filled. But they were in violation of Resolution 
1441. They possessed those and they should have declared them 
and allowed the U.N. to destroy them. 

Senator Inhofe. Okay, because I consider that to be a weapon 
of mass destruction — anj^hing that can potentially kill a million 
people is a weapon of mass destruction. 

Now, the third question that I have is you were quoted as saying 
that you believed Hussein had been pursuing a course of construc- 
tive ambiguity before the war, bluffing about having weapons to 
give the illusion of power and to put up a deterrent, and your quote 
was, "Saddam wanted to enjoy the benefit of having chemical or bi- 
ological weapons without having to pay the cost." 

Now, in other articles, you had suggested that Saddam was being 
deceived by a scientist who duped him into funding nonexistent 


programs. You're quoted as saying, "whatever was left in an effec- 
tive weapons capability was largely subsumed into corrupt money- 
raising schemes by scientists skilled in the art of lying in a police 

Well, some have said there is some inconsistency there. Which of 
those do you think is the case, that he thought he had them or that 
he knew he didn't have them and was bluffing? 

Dr. Kay. Saddam being deceived was a common phenomenon 
after 1998 and crossed all areas, not just WMD, as it became a 
more corrupt society. I remember the New York Times editorial 
which sees an inconsistency being doing that. I actually don't see 
it. He knew he had the capability, he wanted to enjoy the benefits 
of others thinking he had it. The deception related to more ad- 
vanced programs and that's where it continued up until the time 
of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that very much and thank you for 
your responses. 

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator Rob- 
ert Byrd just informed me that he is required to be on the floor for 
the vote and other reasons. I will put into the record his questions 
and I thank you very much. 

Senator Clinton. 

Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Dr. 
Kay, I join with my colleagues in thanking you for your public serv- 
ice, and it's with great admiration that I have followed your service 
over a number of years and I thank you greatly. 

I just wanted to clarify a few other comments that had been re- 
ported in the press just to get the record clear in my own mind. 
There were some references to your decision to leave the effort due 
to the failure to have the full complement of analysts, translators, 
interrogators, and others to work with you. I know that that was 
a concern that had been expressed to this committee and others be- 
cause of the movement of people out of the group into counter- 
insurgency efforts. Was that a factor in either impacting the qual- 
ity and substance of the search or your decision to step down? 

Dr. Kay. Senator Clinton, there were two factors that led me to 
decide it was the appropriate time to return to private life. When 
I agreed to take on this job, I had only two conditions. When you 
negotiate with the Federal Government, salary is not one of the 
things you can negotiate. I said there were two things that were 
important to me. One is that the instrument we were going to use, 
the Iraqi Survey Group, be totally focused on elimination of WMD 
as long as we carried out that mission. 

That was based on two facts. One, my experience with the Fed- 
eral Government is that when you have multiple masters and mul- 
tiple tasks, you get the t5rpical interagency mush and you don't get 
directive action and I didn't think we had the time to do that. 

The second was, and I told George Tenet directly this, my under- 
taking this task from the President of investigating and trying to 
determine reality compared to your estimates, you are going to run 
a moral hazard, the moral hazard of self-investigation, and that the 
only way I was willing to be a party to that is that I had the inde- 
pendence to choose the instrument that was going to be doing it 


and I had the resources that were necessary to do it, and that was 

By September, I was in the process of running battles, both with 
the DOD and with the Intelhgence Community that wanted to redi- 
rect resources and the activities of the ISG to the looming political 
insecurity crisis that was Baghdad. I perfectly understood the dif- 
ficultly we were having. I lived there, I knew how hazardous it 
was. I just thought the ISG and those resources were inappropriate 
for it. 

By November, I had lost that battle, the decision had been made 
to give ISG parallel priorities in addition to WMD and resources 
were being halved off, and at that point, I did what I had said in 
June when I took the job, I'm simply not prepared to run that 
moral hazard for myself or for someone else under those conditions. 

No big surprise and no anger on my part. I was clear going in, 
it's actually in writing on those two points. When the administra- 
tion felt that it couldn't live up to that any longer because of the 
security situation, which I fully understood, I thought it best to let 
someone else who has — who I have great respect for and has capa- 
bilities and I think he can do it — take on the job. 

Senator Clinton. Dr. Kay, I appreciate your explanation, but it 
raises two additional questions, at least in my mind, that we have 
addressed one before, and that is whether we had enough resources 
on the ground to begin with, making this Hobbesian choice as to 
whether to continue with the full complement of resources and per- 
sonnel you required and were agreed to be given to you to pursue 
this important task, or having to divert because we didn't have 
enough resources on the ground to do the other job illustrates 
clearly the confusion at the very center of this whole enterprise, 
post-military action. 

But it raises an additional concern to me, which is that this 
wasn't a priority. If you have a real priority, you figure out how 
to meet that priority. I think that the administration's decision to 
divert resources and personnel speaks volumes about what they 
really thought was at stake. I think by certainly November, if not 
by September, the fact that so much of the documentary evidence 
had been destroyed in the looting, the preliminary reports that you 
provided to Congress and the administration, presaged what has 
become the final conclusion you've reached, that we were not going 
to find such evidence of weapons of mass destruction, certainly 
raises for me serious questions about the real intention of the ad- 
ministration to begin with. 

Second, I'm very interested in what you have concluded about 
the Iraqi decisions to abandon WMD because of the U.N. inspection 
process, that during the 1990s in fact, the international commu- 
nity's efforts to discover and destroy Saddam's weapons was work- 
ing. Is that a fair statement of your findings? 

Dr. Kay. It's a compressed but fair, and I must say I had a num- 
ber of former U.N. inspectors working for me. We often sat around 
and said that it turned out we were better than we thought we 
were in terms of the Iraqis feared that we had capabilities. Al- 
though they took tremendous steps to try to compromise us and to 
lie, in fact the U.N. inspection process achieved quite a bit. 


Senator CLINTON. Of course my time has expired, but I think 
that rightly does raise questions that we should be examining 
about whether or not the U.N. inspection process pursuant to Reso- 
lution 1441 might not also have worked without the loss of life that 
we have confronted both among our own young men and women as 
well as Iraqis. 

Dr. Kay. Senator Clinton, let me just add to that. We have had 
a number of Iraqis who have come forward and said, we did not 
tell the U.N. about what we were hiding nor would we have told 
the U.N. because we would run the risk of our own. I think we 
have learned things that no U.N. inspector would have ever 
learned given the terror regime of Saddam and the tremendous 
personal consequences that scientists had to run by speaking the 

That's not to say, and it's not incompatible with the fact that in- 
spections accomplished a great deal in holding a program down, 
and that's where the surprise is. In holding the program down and 
keeping it from breakout, I think the record is better than we 
would have anticipated. I don't think the record is necessarily bet- 
ter than we thought with regard to getting the final truth because 
of the power of the terrorist state that Saddam Hussein had. 

Senator Clinton. Thank you. 

Chairman Warner. Thank you. Senator. That question you raise 
is an important one, and our witness addressed it and gave his 
views about the resources, but I would withhold any final judgment 
on that issue until we have before this committee General Dayton 
and General Abizaid. 

I talked with General Da5rton 2 weeks ago extensively about this 
issue. He has a somewhat different perspective than our distin- 
guished witness, and as recently as last night I talked to General 
Abizaid, and he likewise has respectfully a different view. 

But there is one point that you all concur on, and that is there 
came a time in that fall period when we were losing brave soldiers, 
death, wounded, and otherwise, and General Abizaid felt that he 
had to call upon some of your people who had capabilities and who 
indeed were on an ongoing basis contributing intelligence from 
your work to the war of trying to stop the insurrection in Iraq. 

Dr. Kay. Senator Warner, as you understand, competing prior- 
ities are the hardest choice that a military commander and others 
have to make. What most people don't understand, but I know you 
do, is how genuinely short we are as a nation of people with certain 
limited capabilities, for example, intelligence officers who speak Ar- 
abic. There are more people in this room, or there were at the be- 
ginning, than we have in the Intelligence Community who are ac- 
tually case officers who speak Arabic. 

That's not a surprise. The committees. Senator, the Intelligence 
Committee has addressed it before. The fact is we've done a very 
poor job of addressing it. Like I say, I have no anger or bitterness 
about it. It was simply a fact of life. 

Chairman WARNER. But I think you also concurred that 

Dr. Kay. We peeled resources away. 

Chairman WARNER. — the urgency of the loss of life and limb 
among the coalition forces dictated bringing together quickly such 
resources as we could to try and stem the tide of that loss. 


Dr. Kay. Absolutely. That was certainly General Abizaid's judg- 

Chairman WARNER. I thank you. I'll go vote, and colleagues, I 

Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman, if you're going to go vote, I'm 
not safe staying. As long as you're here, I know they won't call that 

Chairman Warner. I realize that, but I'll guarantee you you're 
going to be protected. 

Senator Sessions. I will just be brief. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
I think everybody on this committee believed that there were weap- 
ons of mass destruction in Iraq, very few doubted it. I remember 
very distinctly the most questions on that was Chairman Warner, 
and he would ask every major witness, when this war is over, are 
you going to find weapons of mass destruction there? I believe he 
did it a half a dozen times. 

General Abizaid recently testified that after he was asked that 
question, he went back to CENTCOM, called all his staff officers 
in and said. Senator Warner asked me this and are we going to 
find it, and everyone told him that they would. So I don't feel like 
there's any deliberate activities here that would indicate that the 
President or somebody is trying to manipulate intelligence. 

In fact, I felt always that the strongest argument for taking mili- 
tary action was the fact that the war of 1991 never really ended. 
We were shooting at the Iraqis, we were dropping bombs on them, 
they were shooting at our planes, they were in violation of U.N. 
resolutions, they had promised to eliminate weapons of mass de- 
struction as part of that 1991 agreement to stop the American at- 
tack on Baghdad, and they didn't comply with that. 

There was pressure in the world to quit embargoing the people 
of Iraq, they were suffering, and we had to make a decision. Were 
we going to allow them to not comply with the agreement they 
made to end that war, allow them to be free to build weapons of 
mass destruction and threaten the neighborhood, or were we going 
to act under U.N. resolutions? Did those resolutions have any value 
at all? 

So the President, I think, could have justified action on that 
basis had he chosen to. I think that indicates to me he clearly be- 
lieved there were weapons of mass destruction there or he could 
have used other arguments. I guess. Dr. Kay, your view is that 
Saddam Hussein in his own mind had expansionistic intentions 
with regard to the world and that he felt that the possession or 
threat of weapons of mass destruction enhanced that ability to be 
a powerful force in the region. Is that correct? 

Dr. Kay. Absolutely right. Senator, I think he — both in the re- 
gion and he thought of them as a potential weapon to use against 
his own citizens to enforce compulsion and agreement. I mean, the 
Kurds and the Shia were threats to Saddam and he recognized 
them and he had used chemical weapons. 

Senator SESSIONS. Now I noticed that, I believe at one point you 
noted that even his own military officers believed they had them. 

Dr. Kay. Yes. 

Senator SESSIONS. In other words, they would think — would you 
explain that? 


Dr. Kay. In interviewing the Republican Guard generals and the 
Special Republican Guard generals and asking about their capabili- 
ties and having them, the assurance was they didn't personally 
have them and hadn't seen them, but the units on their right or 
left had them, and as you worked the way around the circle, those 
defending Baghdad, which is the immediate area of concern, you 
got this very strange phenomenon of, no, I don't have them, I 
haven't seen them, but look to my right and left. 

This was an intentional ambiguity, and realize freedom of discus- 
sion and movement was not something encouraged in Iraq. For ex- 
ample. Republican Guard divisions never entered into the city lim- 
its of Baghdad. Only the Special Republican Guard (SRG) was al- 
lowed to. You didn't even train in multi-divisional units because of 
that issue of his concern about them. It was a powerful deception 
technology. We have it, but we haven't seen it, but we know that 
someone else has it. 

Senator Sessions. It is true, I think, no one can dispute, that 
had he not had these weapons of mass destruction, and had opened 
his country and plainly demonstrated it, this war would have been 

Dr. Kay. Yes, I think that's true, and that's always been one of 
the mysteries for all of us to determine how — why would he have 
run this risk that cost him his regime and the death of members 
of his family if he didn't have those weapons. 

Senator Sessions. That was certainly, I think, on the heart and 
mind of the Members of Congress. We just felt it was so impossible 
they didn't exist. Now, as your investigation went about, it strikes 
me that in the time building up to this final initiation of military 
action that the Iraqi individuals who may have been involved in 
weapons of mass destruction knew that their programs were the 
target of this action and that they were in violation of U.N. resolu- 
tions, and isn't it true they could have seen themselves as being 
subject to prosecution for war crimes? 

Dr. Kay. Absolutely, and a number of those in custody are wor- 
ried about that greatly. It is one reason they're not talking. 

Senator SESSIONS. So not being uncle ver, they would know and 
would have a real incentive to destroy any evidence that they had 
anything to do with weapons of mass destruction, so we could real- 
istically expect many of the documents that would have shown all 
these actions are no longer in existence. 

Dr. Kay. That's right. Senator, and that's why I referred to the — 
there's probably a level of unresolvable ambiguity we're going to 
have to learn to live with about this program. 

Senator Sessions. I would just add, if you would like to com- 
ment, I think that you indicated the Intelligence Community has 
made mistakes in your opinion and missed much with regard to the 
ideas about Iraq. I think it's wise that a wise leader in this coun- 
try, he has different groups of intelligence agencies really try to 
find out what each is sajdng, to personally interview as close as he 
can to the people it involved, and to make sure that he's getting 
the nuances from different groups. 

Do you think the Vice President or other administration leaders 
should be criticized for talking with individual intelligence agencies 
as they try to make a decision about whether or not to go to war? 


Dr. Kay. Absolutely not. In fact, Senator Sessions, it's, I won't 
say funny, it's one of these strange things for those of us inside, 
I've had analysts complain that no one talked to them and then an- 
alysts who are talked to complain. Look, analysts are not generally 
shrinking — good ones — shrinking violets. They know the difference 
between people, the/re used to being questioned closely, they 
should be questioned closely, and they are. 

That's why I think — I've never met an analyst who felt in this 
case with regard to these sets of issues that there was any inappro- 
priate pressure, and in most cases, they would love to have been 
questioned more, certainly by the Vice President or the President 
or anyone else. That's their profession. 

Senator Sessions. They long for their opportunity to talk to 
someone in authority. 

Dr. Kay. That's what they do. 

Senator Sessions. I thought it was odd that the Vice President 
was criticized for going over on a Saturday morning and sitting 
down with really true people involved in this and asking their opin- 
ions. I just don't think that was a legitimate criticism. Thank you. 

Senator Roberts [presiding]. It is my distinct pleasure serving 
as the acting presiding chairman to recognize Senator Reed for any 
comments he might wish to make. 

Senator Reed. Dr. Kay, let me also commend you, not only for 
your service but for your integrity. We appreciate your being here 

In your discussion with Tom Brokaw, you were asked about the 
nature of the threat posed by Iraq and Mr. Brokaw said, "but an 
imminent threat to the United States," and your response was, 
"Tom, an imminent threat is a political judgment." Now, what does 
that mean? Does that mean that when you're presented with analy- 
sis from — in fact, conflicting analysis — that the President can im- 
pose a political calculation? Particularly a president that seems to 
have a very preconceived notion of the threat from Iraq? 

Dr. Kay. Senator Reed, it means that any president, when he's 
presented with intelligence, has to make a choice about how much 
risk he's prepared to run for the nation that he leads. It is my be- 
lief that regardless of political party, after September 11, the shad- 
owing effects of that horrible tragedy changed, as a nation, the 
level of risk that all of us are prepared to run, that we would like 
to avoid, but where you place yourself on the spectrum of how 
much risk you're going to run is a political responsibility which 
elected officials have and I certainly don't have. 

I think fundamentally that's why in a democracy we elect people 
like you and we elect a president to make those determinations. It's 
not a fixed point that is ever going to be carved as pi's constant. 
It is, what's the world look like and how much risk will I run. 

Senator Reed. But also. Doctor, that judgment has to be logically 
related to the evidence you have before you, and like so many, and 
I think you too, there was a supposition that perhaps had Saddam 
had chemical or biological weapons, less credibility and claims 
about having nuclear weapons or a nuclear program, and in fact, 
not just my conclusion but many people concluded similarly that 
despite that assumption that there was not an imminent threat to 
the United States. That wasn't just a political judgment, that was 


looking at the facts that were presented by the InteUigence Com- 
munity, even if they were flawed, and making a judgment based 
on those facts. 

Dr. Kay. Senator Reed, I think it's often easy to forget that in 
the case of Saddam, here's an individual who had invaded two 
neighboring countries, used chemical weapons against one of those, 
used them against his own neighbors, and who, by U.N. testimony, 
had cheated and lied for a decade. So, as I look back on the evi- 
dence, I understand the decision while honoring the right of any 
elected leader to choose how much risk he's prepared to run, and 
that's what I mean by that. I don't think it's something that is a 
physics constant that you can just pull out of a table. 

Senator Reed. Dr. Kay, you also were quoted and Senator Ken- 
nedy referred to it, "I think if anyone was abused by the intel- 
ligence, it was the President of the United States rather than the 
other way around." Are you suggesting that the President was mis- 
led by the American Intelligence Community? 

Dr. Kay. No, sir. What I'm suggesting is that the actual facts on 
the ground will turn out to be substantially different, at least with 
regard to large stockpiles, than the estimate before, and we better 
understand why that's true. 

There are other reasons and other things about Iraq to be con- 
cerned with, and certainly I think Iraq, if you look back at its his- 
tory of using these weapons, the fact that they remained in viola- 
tion of Resolution 1441, and all of those facts are provable, but 
with regard to the actual existing weapons, which people keep com- 
ing back to because they are the most demonstrable s3niibol of the 
threat, reality is very likely going to turn out to be different than 
the estimates. 

Senator Reed. Dr. Kay, you used the term, abused by the intel- 

Dr. Kay. That's right. 

Senator Reed. He was misled? 

Dr. Kay. If I were your broker and you were investing on my ad- 
vice, something of course I would not advise you to do, and at the 
end of the day, I had said Enron was the greatest company in the 
world and you had lost a substantial amount of money because it 
turned out differently, you would think I had abused you. I think 
the estimate is going to turn out to be different than reality. That's 
abuse as far as I'm concerned. 

Senator Reed. Part of the intelligence process, as I understand 
it, is not only the presentation of evidence and analysis by the 
agencies, but the probing questioning of leaders, decision makers, 
particularly when the evidence is not totally reconciled. Do you 
think that those probing questions were made, particularly since so 
many people in the administration had preconceived notions about 
the nature of the threat? 

Dr. Kay. Senator Reed, I was not party to that. I hope in what- 
ever process of review that's going on that the full record is out 
there. I will just say I'm convinced myself if I had been there, pre- 
sented with what I have seen as the record of the intelligence esti- 
mates, I would have come to the same conclusion that the political 
leaders did. 


Senator Reed. Dr. Kay, is North Korea today a gathering serious 

Dr. Kay. North Korea is an enigma probably with nuclear weap- 
ons and long-range missiles. I would probably put it higher up on 
my scale of gathering threat. I think it's an existing threat. 

Senator Reed. We are approaching North Korea with the same 
deeply flawed Intelligence Community that abused the President of 
the United States? 

Dr. Kay. I have no knowledge of whether we're approaching it 
with the same — in a case where the reality will turn out to be dif- 
ferent from the estimate. I just don't know. I think that's an appro- 
priate question for you and others to ask. 

Senator Reed. Dr. Kay, the U.N. inspectors were readmitted into 
Iraq for a brief period of time. Had they been allowed to continue 
their mission with adequate support, would they have likely 
reached the same conclusion you have? 

Dr. Kay. All I can say is that among an extensive body of Iraqi 
scientists who are talking to us, they have said we had — the U.N. 
interviewed us, we did not tell them the truth, we did not show 
them this equipment, we did not talk about these programs, we 
couldn't do it as long as Saddam was in power. I suspect regardless 
of how long they had stayed, that attitude would have been the 

Senator Reed. Just one final point because my time has expired. 
I do recollect that there were some missiles destroyed because of 
either their disclosure or discovery by these inspectors, which sug- 
gested another data point, we seldom remember that too, remem- 
ber that despite 

Dr. Kay. Absolutely, that's true. 

Senator Reed. So that there was a degree of cooperation and a 
degree of success, perhaps not as conclusive as yours, but that was 
happening, is that correct? 

Dr. Kay. It wasn't cooperation. This was the case of the Al 
Samoud 2 missile, which had been, even under UNSCOM days, a 
source of dispute with regard to its range. They continued to de- 
velop it after the inspectors left in 1998. By the time the U.N. was 
readmitted and there actually existed Al Samoud 2s, there was no 
way you could contend that that was shorter than 150 kilometers, 
and in fact destruction had begun of those missiles, that's correct. 

Senator Reed. My time has expired. Thank you. Dr. Kay. 

Chairman Warner [presiding]. Thank you. Senator. 

Senator Roberts. 

Senator Roberts. Yes, thank you very much. 

Chairman Warner. I, by way of introduction. Senator Roberts, 
say that I feel that you and the committee that you lead are mak- 
ing a lot of progress towards coming to a body of fact and putting 
it together that will help not only Members of Congress, but others 
trying to have a better understanding of this situation. 

Senator Roberts. I thank the chairman and I would hope he 
would write a personal note to Senator Kennedy and Senator 
Levin, maybe indicate that as well. 

Dr. Kay, thank you for your service and thanks to the member- 
ship of the ISG team that you led. You have earned our respect. 
We have repeated that in the Intelligence Committee where you 


appeared as of this morning for 2 hours. That was classified and 
closed, we won't get into that, but I want to assure you of one 
thing. There is an outside investigation taking place under the ju- 
risdiction of the Senate Intelligence Committee, which is our juris- 
diction and our obligation. This involves 10 staffers working 24/7 
on floor-to-ceiling documents, having interviewed over 175 people, 
analysts, critics, and everybody else that wants to come in. We take 
that job very seriously and we are progressing. I think that when 
Members finally get the draft, the first draft of the working paper, 
many of these questions will be answered. I personally take some 
umbrage at people, who for one reason or another, think we need 
to have an outside investigation before our inquiry is even com- 

As a matter of fact, we had a memo that came out several 
months ago indicating conclusions before we even finished the in- 
quiry, so I have some strong feelings about that. In response to 
Senator Levin and in reference to the Intelligence Committee in- 
quiry, the draft inquiry report is complete. It will be available to 
Members next Thursday and for their study and their perusal, and 
it's going to take some time because you have to wade through this 
and it's very voluminous. Hopefully during that week they will be- 
come educated and many of these questions will be answered. 

As I said, we interviewed 175 analysts and critics and some pol- 
ic5miakers and others, and like your analysts at the ISG, not one 
said that they were intimidated or coerced or that their product 
was somehow manipulated. Every statement referred to by Senator 
Levin with regard to the administration officials was a reflection 
of what was provided by the Intelligence Community. I mean, why 
would you do otherwise? 

The reason that the Vice President apparently keeps referring to 
the trailers as mobile labs is that that is the view of the CIA as 
I speak, it's on the CIA web page. It is a part of the National Intel- 
ligence Estimate, which is provided to the Vice President and the 
National Security Council and the President. That's what the CIA 
believes right now, a very clear paragraph that goes into very spe- 
cific reasons as to why they think that this is a mobile lab. 

Now, as you pointed out, there are other points of view. That's 
always the case in regards to, I guess, intelligence. By the way, 
this National Intelligence Estimate was mandated by Senator 
Graham and Senator Durbin in 60 — or in 30 days, and so to some 
extent, I believe part of the problem is it became a dump, if you 
will, and I don't mean to use that as a pejorative, of all past intel- 
ligence, which you have indicated most of us think was on a train 
that was moving and that train just kept moving and it was very 
difficult to change the direction of the opinion of virtually every In- 
telligence Community all throughout the world. I think the draft 
report again will answer all of the Senators' questions. 

You recently have been quoted in the press, as has been said, as 
saying that the Intelligence Community owes the President an ex- 
planation about what went wrong with their analysis. You also 
said it's not a political issue — well, it is, but it shouldn't be — it's an 
issue of the capabilities of one's intelligence service to collect valid 
and truthful information. 


What do you think went wrong, both in the analysis and collec- 
tion of intelligence? You've already touched on this. Have you seen 
any evidence through your discussions with the Intelligence Com- 
munity analysts or officials over at the DCI that the Intelligence 
Community recognizes that all of the intelligence and their analy- 
sis was so wrong? Any admission on that part, and do you have 
any thoughts on what should be done to fix these problems? 

I am really interested in your commentary on the dots. Prior to 
September 11, if you had 10 dots to connect, you had to connect 
eight or nine of them to at least have a report and a threat warn- 
ing out there. After September 11, so that we wouldn't be risk- 
averse, if you connected two or three dots and you didn't report, 
you were really in trouble. So the Intelligence Community can't 
have it both ways. First, we reaUy criticized them for saying wait, 
wait, wait, wait until you have the appropriate jigsaw puzzle in 
place that you can really read the intelligence. After September 11, 
why, we have a situation, say, if you have two or three of the dots 
connected, why, then you're criticized as well. 

Now, that's a speech, not a question, but if you have any 
thoughts on this, I'd appreciate hearing from you. 

Dr. Kay. No, I think the very appropriate thing. Senator Roberts, 
would be to concur. 

Senator Roberts. I appreciate that. What went wrong, both in 
the collection and the analysis of intelligence? You've touched on 

Dr. Kay. Senator Roberts, you're far more likely having done, as 
you quite rightly point out, a far more exhaustive study than I've 
had the opportunity. I've been on the sharp end of the stick out 
there. I think it will turn out that we will find that there were 
major shortfalls in collection. As a Nation, and this really goes back 
over 20 years, we decided to concentrate most of our intelligence 
resources on technical collection. We got better definition from 
space. There's only so much you can see when you're looking at 
judgments of this sort, and we're particularly bad about under- 
standing societal trends. 

I think we will, in the end, when the appropriate historian comes 
around, be able to say that somewhere after 1998 the social glue 
that held Iraq together had been corrosively destroyed by Saddam 
Hussein, that it had become the ultimate criminal terrorist conspir- 
acy internally. That's one reason we're having such great difficulty 
and our troops are having such great difficulty putting it back to- 
gether again. It's not just the number of troops there, it's that the 
glue that holds people together in a relationship that allows co- 
operation was destroyed by Saddam Hussein, just as the infrastruc- 
ture was destroyed. 

But that turns out to be one of the hardest things for intelligence 
services to read. As you recall, we got it wrong in World War II, 
and it was the very famous strategic bombing survey. All the intel- 
ligence leading up through the end of World War II said the bomb- 
ing campaign was destroying the German will to fight, the civilians 
were less willing, and the German war production was falling. As 
it turned out afterwards, the German will to fight increased under 
the bombing and the war production went up to the last 2 months 
of the war, it was still increasing. 


In the case of the Soviet Union — well, skip Vietnam, but very 
similar estimates about societal determination and economy turned 
out to be wrong. After the fall of the Soviet Union, what had looked 
like a 10-foot power turned out to be an economy that barely ex- 
isted and a society that had horrible levels of human health prob- 
lems, of lack of education and all, leading to the current situation. 
It is a fundamental issue that we have — all intelligence services 
have had understanding that, and yet in many ways, it turns out 
to probably be far more important than counting trailers, and yet 
we've invested in counting trailers as opposed to understanding the 

I am convinced that we have sadly underfunded and developed 
our human intelligence capability, we have genuinely become risk- 
adverse, and looked at ways that will not put Americans either at 
political or human risk as being spies, and tried to do it on the 
cheap using others. I think there will turn out to be trade-craft 
problems that you probably have already identified, and I haven't 
had the advantage of reading your report, that are out there that 
need to be looked at. 

The last one, which you referred to, we've put the analysts under 
tremendous pressure, and the tendency is to overanalyze limited 
data. There is a point where an analysts simply needs to tell peo- 
ple, I can't draw a conclusion, I don't have enough data, go get me 
more data. But in the wake of September 11, believe me, that is 
difficult to do. It's always been difficult, but it is much more dif- 
ficult now. 

Senator Roberts. I thank you for your candor and service. My 
time has expired, but I would say we are constantly having these 
"Oh my God" hearings in the Intelligence Committee, "Oh my 
God," how did this happen? You go back to the U.S.S. Cole and you 
go back to the Khartoum chemical plant, you go back to the nu- 
clear test in India, you go back to Khobar Towers, you go back to 
the Belgrade bombing, and it goes on and on and on, same kind 
of thing. I hope that we have to come up with better solutions on 
how to fix these problems that we have been referring to. I know 
that Senator Collins is waiting patiently so I yield back my time. 

Chairman WARNER. We're going to recognize Senator Dayton in 

Senator ROBERTS. Oh, I'm sorry. 

Chairman Warner. Thank you. 

Senator Dayton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kay, I met you 
in July in Baghdad, it was 115 degrees there and we left after 3 
days and you stayed on and under those conditions to persevere as 
you have and with the veracity you've shown in your report and 
your candor here today, I would echo the others. Your service to 
our country has been not only patriotic but heroic, and I thank you 
for that. 

It seems to be one of the traps that we may be falling into here, 
and I'm not an expert, so I ask you the question, are all weapons 
of mass destruction alike? It would strike me intuitively they are 
not, and if we're talking about biological capabilities, chemical ca- 
pabilities, I would draw a line, say nuclear strikes me as something 
of a different order, conventional weapons, just about everjiihing 


we put into the air or on land or in the water these days I would 
think constitutes a weapon of mass destruction. 

Are we putting ourselves in a trap here where anything of any 
viability at all starts to fall into that category? 

Dr. Kay. It's an important question, particularly as technology 
drives capabilities of even what formerly would have been said con- 
ventional weapons of capability to do mass disruption at least, if 
not mass destruction. Same thing is true in the cyber era. We have 
today an e-mail worm spreading throughout the world that is doing 
vast mass disruption, if not mass destruction, and may be doing 
that in some areas. 

So these old terms don't serve us particularly well. It's one thing 
I hope to write about as I finish this. 

Senator Dayton. Which weapons of mass destruction qualify in 
that upper echelon of truly mass destruction? 

Dr. Kay. I think all of us have and would continue to put the nu- 
clear weapons in a different category. It's a single weapon that can 
do tremendous damage as opposed to multiple weapons that can do 
the same order of damage. The fire bombing of Tokyo in terms of 
number of people killed was roughly equivalent to a single bomb 
in Nagasaki, but it took a lot more aircraft to do it. 

So I still treat, and I think we should politically treat nuclear as 
a difference. But I must say, the revolution in biology, some devel- 
opments in cyber, I think we're going to have a blurring out there 
of capabilities, and that makes the control, it makes the intel- 
ligence problem far more difficult to estimate. 

Senator Dayton. Based on your general knowledge, how many 
countries would you say in the world today would qualify under the 
category of developing weapons of mass destruction and related 
program activities, or having such activities? 

Dr. Kay. Senator Dayton, I hesitate to give you an off-the-cuff 
number because I know I'll probably — it's going to be like the 85 
percent, I'm going to have to live with it for longer than I want to. 
I would say that in the nuclear area, in addition to those that we 
know have — possess nuclear weapons, that includes India 

Senator Dayton. I want to go to the vernacular that we're using, 
this broader category. 

Dr. Kay. The broader categorj'? Oh, I suspect you're talking 
about probably 50 countries that have programs that would fall 
somewhere in that broader vernacular. 

Senator Dayton. So if we're going to take out those countries or 
their governments which are engaged in what we would call weap- 
ons of mass destruction-related program activities, we're going to 
be cutting quite a wide swath. 

Dr. Kay. Senator Dayton, I think you're on to the issue. We no 
longer are going to be living in a world in which we can control ca- 
pabilities. Intentions are what are going to be important. Quite 
frankly, that's what made Saddam so dangerous in my view. Here 
was an individual who had invaded his neighbors, used chemical 
weapons against one of them and used them against the others, so 
it was hard to have a benign interpretation of that individual's in- 
tentions, and the real challenge for intelligence is going to be giv- 
ing to our political leaderships not just judgment about capabilities, 
but judgments against real intentions, and that is tough. 


Senator Dayton. Mr. Chairman — well, I guess he left — I will 
commend the chairman even in his absence for holding this hear- 
ing and letting these answers, the chips fall where they may, be- 
cause I think what we're at issue here goes way beyond politics or 
partisan advantage one way or the other. This is about the survival 
of our country and the world as we know it. 

I guess I would ask you in the context of I'm assuming that our — 
and I'm not on the Intelligence Committee — but I'm impressed that 
there are very dedicated men and women who are spending all of 
their lives trjdng their very best to come up with the answers to 
these very difficult questions and assessments. Given the limits 
that you say which go both ways, and Iraq may be less developed 
and countries like Iran and Libya farther developed, what does 
that argue about the wisdom of a policy of pre-emptive strikes? 

Dr. Kay. I don't know about the wisdom, but it certainly argues 
about the difficulty of doing it wisely. 

Senator Dayton. I guess it would strike me, and I hope — again, 
the chairman's not here — but I would hope we would hold a hear- 
ing or two about the success, it appears, with regard to Libya and 
the administration's role, and I gather the preceding administra- 
tion's role, so in secret negotiations which have brought about a de- 
nuclearizing of that country and that threat, which certainly 
sounds like it would qualify in the upper echelon as you describe 
it, and contrast that approach and its success without a loss of 
American life in that country to what has occurred in Iraq. 

So I hope we can look at both sides of this question and I will 
give the administration credit, whatever the case may be, for its 
successes, but I also want to recognize, I think, the grave risks that 
this limitation of intelligence information and its veracity imposes 
on a doctrine that says we're going to preemptively strike a country 
that we believe has things that we've now discovered in this case, 
with the best of intentions I'll concede that, they did not have. 

My time is up, but again, I thank you for your public service, sir. 

Senator Allard [presiding]. Since the chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee has had to go vote, I'll go ahead and be chair- 
man temporarily until he gets back. In the meantime, it's my turn 
to go ahead and talk to Dr. Kay and visit with him about some of 
the issues related to his duties. 

First of all, I'm trying to think back at the time our men and 
women were going into Iraq, there was a lot of concern at that par- 
ticular point in time about Iraqis having weapons of mass destruc- 
tion, particularly chemical weapons, and did you find evidence that 
there was chemical weapons there at the battlefield that perhaps 
maybe was not in large quantities, but small quantities, that would 
have been a decided threat to our men and women on the field? 

Dr. Kay. Senator Allard, that's really one of our immediate fo- 
cuses, because both of the concern, and consequently the threat it 
posed to Americans, but also because of the evidence we kept, as 
you will recall, discovering Iraqi defense chemical gear, protective 
suits and all, as we moved across. We have not found any chemical 
weapons that were present on the battlefield even in small number. 

Senator Allard. So all we had is a history of him having used 
weapons of mass destruction using chemicals because we knew 


about the Kurds and where he had used chemicals in that particu- 
lar instance, is that right? 

Dr. Kay. No, I would not say it was just the history. There was 
real reporting that he had it, Iraqi defectors and others, that he 
had it, and ambiguous conversations overheard. So it was more 
than a history, it was a reality, and if you've ever had the oppor- 
tunity to put one of the U.S. protective suits on, you realize the 
men and women you saw dressed up in those chemical suits as 
they marched towards Baghdad did that out of real fear that he 
had chemical weapons. That was not because of political pressure. 
You don't put those suits on for political pressure. They're too un- 
comfortable. It was a genuine fear based on the best available in- 
formation that was present at that time. 

Senator Allard. Yes. I recall about the time that our men and 
women were going into the field in Iraq that also they discovered 
a nuclear disposal site, if you recall that. They had that on TV and 
they actually showed the barrels of nuclear waste. 

Dr. Kay. Oh, yes, okay. 

Senator Allard. Do you recall that? 

Dr. Kay. Yes, I do. 

Senator Allard. What was the source of that nuclear material? 
Why was that there and what was the source of that nuclear mate- 

Dr. Kay. There was a large amount of nuclear waste and mate- 
rial that the U.N. had purposely left there as the Iraqi program 
was taken down. 

Senator Allard. That was after the Persian Gulf conflict? 

Dr. Kay. That was after the Persian Gulf conflict. What was re- 
moved was the direct use material that could have been used in a 
normal fission weapon. On the other hand, there was a large 
amount of yellow cake, there was nuclear residue, highly radio- 
active, various sources, there was a large cesium source, a cobalt 
source, and others that in fact had been stored away, and I think 
the waste you're referring to is that. 

Senator Allard. Do we have any idea of the origin of that mate- 

Dr. Kay. The origin of most of that material is pretty well under- 
stood. The Iraqis both mined uranium of their own as well as im- 
ported uranium in the 1980s from Africa. 

Senator ALLARD. What country in Africa would that come from? 

Dr. Kay. Niger. 

Senator Allard. Niger? 

Dr. Kay. The French had provided reactor fuel, as had the Rus- 
sians provided reactor fuel, and some of the waste probably had 
origins in that. 

Senator ALLARD. Do we know when that nuclear program was 
brought down and when that material was stored in that waste 

Dr. Kay. We know very precisely, Senator. We started doing it 
in late 1991, and it continued — it was almost complete by 1995 as 
material was moved out of Iraq and was sealed and was stored. It's 
very well-documented. The International Atomic Energy Agency 
did a good job. 


Senator Allard. Okay. The National Intelligence Estimate con- 
cluded that Iraq could build its first nuclear weapon when it ac- 
quired sufficient weapons-grade material. Did you think that con- 
clusion was accurate? 

Dr. Kay. Yes. You have to realize this was a country that had 
designed and had gone through a decade-long nuclear program, 
they knew the secrets. But we took away the critical element in 
making a nuclear weapon once you know the secrets, which they 
had and they'd run the physical tests, is the actual fissile material. 
It's difficult, expensive, takes a fairly substantial footprint to de- 
velop. The estimate, as I read that estimate, and I think all of us 
did who were concerned with it, is, if they managed to acquire a 
sufficient amount of plutonium or high-enriched uranium from a 
place like the former Soviet Union stockpile, how long would it 
take to fashion that into a nuclear explosive device, and I think 
that estimate was actually fairly conservative. 

Senator Allard. You ran over one part of your statement that 
I want to go back. You said they actually ran a test on the material 
that they had there? 

Dr. Kay. With regard to nuclear material? 

Senator Allard. Yes. 

Dr. Kay. During the 1980s they ran a number of tests using both 
what are normal simulants that you use in a physics experiments, 
as well as they had separated out a small quantity of plutonium 
and they had some high-enriched uranium that had been supplied 
in French fuel. 

At the time of the first Gulf War, we subsequently learned, they 
were taking the French fuel and trying to produce, fashion to- 
gether, a crude nuclear explosive device, for which they had run ex- 
periments understanding how much conventional explosions it 
would take to move the mass together. They were good physicists. 

Senator Allard. Did they use the aluminum tubes at that point 
in time to enrich their uranium, do you we know? 

Dr. Kay. No, they did not. They relied on different processes. 

Senator Allard. Okay. I have one other question. What can you 
tell us about Iraq's efforts to restarts its nuclear program in 2000 
and 2001? 

Dr. Kay. As best as has been determined, and this is obviously 
something the investigation is continuing, in 2000 they had decided 
that their nuclear establishment had deteriorated to such a point 
that it was totally useless. They started — the main center is a cen- 
ter called al-Tuatha, which is — in fact, I think you probably flew 
over it — you generally do when you go around Baghdad. It's a large 
site but the physical facility had seriously deteriorated and they 
started building new buildings, renovating it, hiring some new 
staff, and bringing them together. 

They ran a few physics experiments, re-ran experiments they 
had actually run in the 1980s. Fortunately, from my point of view. 
Operation Iraqi Freedom intervened and we don't know how or how 
fast that would have gone ahead. 

Senator Allard. So it was definitely a threat as far as you're 
concerned, in 2001, 2000? 


Dr. Kay. Given their history, it was certainly an emerging pro- 
gram that I would not have looked forward to their continuing to 
pursue. It was not yet up as a full nuclear production site again. 

Senator Allard. Thank you, Dr. Kay. I now call on Senator 

Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kay, thank you 
again for being here. I know that a number of people have ex- 
pressed their gratitude and I want to join in that chorus. Let me 
just ask a few questions here. How long were you searching for 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq? 

Dr. Kay. I arrived in June and I left in late December. 

Senator Pryor. Were you on the ground most of that time? 

Dr. Kay. Yes, only except the time I was required to be back here 
before you. 

Senator Pryor. Right. How many sites did you or your team visit 
in Iraq? 

Dr. Kay. Senator Pryor, I'm sure we can give you the exact num- 
ber, but it was in the hundreds. 

Senator Pryor. Also I'm sure you looked at, what, thousands of 
pages of documents, is that fair? 

Dr. Kay. Closer to hundreds of thousands of pages of documents. 

Senator Pryor. How many inspectors and, I guess you might 
want to call them analysts, did you have on your team there to as- 
sist in this effort? 

Dr. Kay. Roughly in terms of — they fall into three areas, to give 
you the count that is — you can deal with and make some meaning. 
In terms of subject matter experts, that is, analysts, we had at the 
max count somewhere around 110, maybe as high as 130 at the 
very max, it can go lower than that at other times. In terms of case 
officers, these are clandestine officers who are used to working in 
the field and equipped by trade craft and training to do that, the 
figure comes out to be somewhere around 30 to occasionally 40. 
Translators and interpreters was roughly somewhere between 300 
and 400 at various times. 

Senator Pryor. Okay. Did you have full access to our intel- 
ligence, our pertinent intelligence on WMD? 

Dr. Kay. Absolutely. 

Senator Pryor. Nothing was screened from you as far as you 

Dr. Kay. As far as I know, nothing was screened, nor do I believe 
anj^hing was screened. 

Senator Pryor. Right. At what point during this process did you 
start to get that uneasy feeling about WMD in Iraq where you 
thought you might not find anj^hing or your search might be un- 

Dr. Kay. Senator Pryor, it was not a 3 a.m. wake-up call in the 
middle of the night, it was the emerging picture that we had gath- 
ered, and by late September, early October, we were all starting to 
look at the data and look at the conclusion and come to it, and cer- 
tainly by November, I think if asked, and I have been asked inter- 
nally, I kept saying, I think we have a program here that looks dif- 
ferent from the estimate with regard to assembled weapons. 


Senator Pryor. All right. At what point did you begin commu- 
nicating that with the Pentagon or the administration or the CIA? 
I don't know exactly who you're reporting to. 

Dr. Kay. It was with the intelligence agencies. Oh, I think my 
first communication about this program may look like one that 
doesn't have assembled weapons but has capability to rapidly re- 
start his program actually came in July based on, here again I'm, 
as all analysts, this may have been a case of connecting dots when 
there were few dots, and certainly by the fall, there was a fairly 
regular dialogue with regard to these. 

Senator Pryor. Okay. I know that when you're talking to the in- 
telligence agencies, to some extent you're talking to the White 
House, but did you ever report this directly to the White House? 

Dr. Kay. No. In fact, I've spoken to the President, directly to the 
White House only once. It was in July when I was back. The chan- 
nels went, as they appropriately should, through the DCI. 

Senator Pryor. In this summer and fall period where you started 
expressing concerns and started to tell them about your findings 
and some of your conclusions perhaps, what was their response to 
that? What was their reaction to that? 

Dr. Kay. It was the absolutely appropriate one: where's the data? 
What's the data? Have you considered this? Will you look here? 
Have you done that? It was the healthy skepticism and dialogue 
that I too exercise with regard to my own staff and I expect to be 
held to. There was absolutely no inappropriate response, no refusal 
to consider it. It was the healthy skepticism and demand for data, 
which is appropriate. 

Senator Pryor. You've testified today that we know Iraq had 
some WMD and used some in the 1980s and on into the very early 
1990s. What is your thinking on how they got from that point, 
where they clearly had some, to today, where I guess your conclu- 
sion, it's fair to say, is they don't have a weapons program, and if 
they have any WMD at all, it's very small. 

Dr. Kay. It's not that they don't have a weapons program — didn't 
have a weapons program. I hope they don't now. It is that they had 
a weapons program, but it was a program activity designed to 
allow future production at some time, and that the missile program 
was actually moving ahead. I continue to emphasize I think is one 
that we've paid inadequate attention to. 

I think how they got there is they got there because the U.N. in- 
spectors did a better job. I had them tell me in 1991, they told me 
personally, directly, "you're not behaving like we thought a U.N. in- 
spector would behave." I took that as a compliment. We were intru- 
sive, we were aggressive in the best sense of that word. As we kept 
finding things and then the key defection, we come back to Hussein 
Kamal in 1995, which they feared would lay open their whole past 
5 years of deceit and lying to the U.N., they decided to reduce the 
thing that they were most vulnerable to, and that's large retained 
stocks, knowing that they could — at some point they'd get rid of us, 
they thought, and they could restart production, so they kept the 
technology but they didn't — they came to what I think is a fair con- 
clusion, why keep stockpiles of weapons that are vulnerable to in- 
spectors when you've lost your delivery capability? Wait until you 
have your delivery capability and then it's a relatively short order. 


We have documentary evidence and testimony that Saddam and 
Uday and Qusay asked in both 2000 and 2001 how long it would 
take to restart production of mustard and VX nerve gas. This was 
a key point in part of this reckoning of when did you think they 
might be following a different strategy than the estimate. When 
you get senior officials asking, how long will it take you to produce 
these agents, that tells you at least to be awake to the possibility 
that that means they didn't have those agents. 

Senator Pryor. So, and this is my last question because I'm out 
of time, is it your opinion then that the regime that was set up 
after the Gulf War in 1991 was at least to some degree effective 
in ending their WMD capabilities? 

Dr. Kay. I think UNSCOM deserves a considerable amount of 
credit for disarming and destrojdng, the typical thing which all of 
us who served on UNSCOM are proud of. In terms of destruction, 
we destroyed more of the WMD program than bombing did during 
the Gulf War. 

I think where we always worried, and appropriately so, we know 
now, is getting at what they retained and what they hid, because 
you were up against things that were smaller, easier to hide in a 
terrorist regime. We took the easy stuff out, nuclear reactors, big 
plants, large amounts of material, and that gets to your earlier 
very good question, why did they change the strategy? They 
changed to the things that we were not particularly good at un- 
masking, that would allow them to restart the program as soon as 
they got rid of us. 

Senator Pryor. That's all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Chairman WARNER [presiding]. Thank you very much. Senator. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kay, let me 
start by joining my colleagues in thanking you for your most im- 
pressive extraordinary public service and we very much appreciate 
your being here today to share your experiences and your conclu- 
sions with us. 

I am deeply troubled by what appears to be a colossal failure by 
our intelligence agencies, and I would note that this failure spans 
agencies, it spans years, but it also spans countries. It really is a 
global intelligence failure, it wasn't just our intelligence agencies 
alone that so misread this vital situation. 

I personally believe that the war was justified for the reasons 
that Senator McCain listed as well as others. We know that Sad- 
dam had chemical and biological weapons at one point, we know 
that he invaded his neighbors, that he used chemical weapons to 
kill some 5,000 Kurdish citizens, we know that he planned to as- 
sassinate a former President of the United States, he shot at our 
planes, he violated the cease fire agreement for the first Gulf War, 
he ignored numerous United Nations resolutions. So there was lots 
of justification to hold Saddam accountable. 

But what if we're faced with making a decision where there isn't 
this additional justification? That is what is so frightening to me, 
because we make such serious life and death decisions relying on 
this intelligence information. I, for one, don't know whether or not 
to trust the intelligence estimates on North Korea now. We've 


turned out to be wrong in the other direction on Libya and Iran. 
So that's why this is so troubhng to me. 

It's particularly troubling because the briefings that we had were 
so detailed and so specific, and I want to cite an example. We had 
known based on the Iraqi declarations to the U.N. inspectors that 
Iraq had produced thousands of tons of deadly chemical weapons 
such as mustard gas, sarin, and VX, as well as very large quan- 
tities of biological agents such as anthrax. I recall being told, and 
I used it in my statement, that when the inspectors left in 1998, 
there were very large discrepancies between the weapons that were 
declared and the amounts that were destroyed. 

For example, I was told that at least 1.5 tons — tons — of deadly 
nerve agent, the VX, were unaccounted for. What, in your opinion, 
happened to all of those chemical agents and biological agents? 
Where did the VX and anthrax go? 

Dr. Kay. It is still a subject of investigation. Let me deal with 
the VX. Interesting enough, the Iraqis, we now have the records of 
the Iraqis as they tried to investigate that in order to get the evi- 
dence to answer UNSCOM and later UNMOVIC on that. 

This is what happens. Remember, they had the ends of two cha- 
otic wars. They had the end of the Iran/Iraq war and they had the 
end of Gulf War II. One large amount of VX — it had been forward 
deployed in Iraq towards the Kuwaiti border — as they were moving 
it back in 1991, there was a traffic accident. The truck carrying it 
was totally consumed in a fire. They documented it in part, but 
there was the usual embarrassment of do we tell Saddam we've 
just burned up a large amount of chemical warfare agent, so it 
wasn't fully reported and fully documented. They didn't do analyt- 
ical sampling so they had nothing — and only partial records. 

That now looks like an explanation that increasingly looks like 
it was true. Some of it was simply accounting errors that were 
wrong in material balance. Others are going to be in what I call 
this unresolved ambiguity, that we may simply never know. 

Senator Collins. I'm intrigued by the interviews that you con- 
ducted with some of the Iraqi scientists, who outlined a plan of de- 
ception of their own where they may have told Saddam what he 
wanted to hear for fear of the consequences to them if they said 
they couldn't deliver on certain weapons. That leads me to ask you, 
do you believe that Saddam himself believed that he had these 
stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons? I realize that's in 
some ways an unanswerable question, but what is your feeling on 
that, what's your judgment? 

Dr. Kay. It's one of the toughest questions around and we have 
just little pieces of evidence, so let me tell you now what I believe, 
because I don't know, or what I think is true, but what the evi- 
dence shows. We have these questions about how long will it take 
you to produce? It sounds like he knows he doesn't have anything 
and so he's asking for restarts of production, and these included 
Saddam, Uday, and Qusay. 

There are other reports from the interrogations that at times 
Saddam referred to secret stockpiles, small amounts that were ex- 
isting, no confirmation of that. My suspicion is that he probably 
thought he was closer to getting it, could restart faster than the 
scientists and engineers knew it would take. So when it really 


came down, these requests, one in — I think it's two in 2001, in 
which they gave him estimates that were longer than he obviously 
had expected them to be, was when they were confronting the 
truth. I think he had been told they had got rid of it all but that 
we could really turn the tap on very quickly, and it turned out they 
lied about how quickly. It was quick but it wasn't as quick as he 

But this is one of those areas, as Senator Warner correctly keeps 
referring to, as where the investigation really does need to con- 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman Warner. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Ben Nelson. 

Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kay, I 
want to add my appreciation for your candor. It's very refreshing 
to see such public candor in a time when too often the trend is pro- 
gressive candor, but I want to thank you for many of your points 
that you've made because I think it helps us understand the impor- 
tance of intelligence and the importance of accurate intelligence, 
and yet the difficulty there is in first of all achieving the role that 
you need to gather intelligence, let alone establishing its accuracy. 

It's based on that that I have concerns about the use of preemp- 
tive force being predicated on intelligence. I think many supported 
the President's decision to use force to liberate Iraq and believe 
that the world's a safer place because of Saddam being in a prison 
cell. But many of us supported Saddam's removal because we be- 
lieved in the credibility of the intelligence that was provided, and 
we believe also, and I believe personally, that the President did not 
intentionally mislead the American people, nor do I believe Prime 
Minister Blair would mislead his public. 

But there is unquestionably a credibility issue here that must be 
addressed. That credibility problem involves the accuracy of the in- 
telligence information, or lack of accuracy, its uses, and most likely, 
its embellishment. Your findings indicate that Iraq had only a rudi- 
mentary chemical, biological, and nuclear program, and you've 
identified and you've said that weapons of mass destruction-related 
program activities, and I have to ask you, what does that mean? 
What are weapons of mass destruction-related program activities? 

Dr. Kay. That includes, for example, and take the specific exam- 
ples of the Iraqis, a program to develop a substitute for a major 
precursor for VX using indigenous production capability and indige- 
nous chemicals so they would not have to import it. 

It includes a study, for example, on a simulant for anthrax. Pre- 
1991, their anthrax was liquid. They had tried to freeze-dry it and 
get it down to the dry anthrax, which is stable and much more 
deadly, lethal, as we found out here. By using this simulant, they 
actually pushed about two generations the production capability. 
Now, for this simulant, the same production capability that pro- 
duces it, is exactly the same that produces anthrax, so they in fact 
had moved ahead their anthrax capability by working on a 

So it's in those areas that you get program — they had looked at 
the lethality of various agents and classified them. That's WMD-re- 
lated work. 


Senator Ben Nelson. All right. You've indicated that you've 
found no evidence of existing stockpiles of WMDs. Is it possible 
that they found their way to Syria? Is there any way of knowing 
whether they found their way to Syria or to another location? 

Dr. Kay. In terms of possibility, you can't rule out anything. The 
way I tried to direct our activities, I knew we were not going to 
get permission to conduct inspections in Syria as much as I would 
professionally and personally have enjoyed it. I also knew that the 
intelligence we collected that showed movement of material across 
the Iraq/Sjoian border didn't show what was in the containers. 

So you try to answer that question by sa5ang, was there some- 
thing to be moved back across the border? Look at production capa- 
bility. It is totally inadequate for saying, did they move small 
amounts, did they move technology, did they move documentation? 
Absolutely possible, I would say probable. But my personal belief 
is that they did not move large stockpiles because I do not believe 
they had reconstituted the capability that had produced large 

So that's how you get at it. Is it inadequate? Yes. Will it probably 
always remain as an — unless the Syrian regime really changes 
course, will it always remain uncertain? Yes. 

Senator Ben Nelson. Is it a basic assumption on your part or 
a suspicion that's based on the evidence that you've said, move- 
ment of certain undefined, non-inspected containers or other activ- 
ity that took it across — took things across the border? 

Dr. Kay. My belief that they did not move large stockpiles of 
WMD to Sjrria is based on my conclusion that there were not large 
stockpiles to move. My assumption that it might have been some- 
thing else is there was so much movement that you just can't rule 
out what was there. I don't know. 

Senator Ben Nelson. Well, is it fair to say that the people who 
are in charge of the weapons of mass destruction activity probably 
were better informed about how to secrete it than those who de- 
cided to bury airplanes? 

Dr. Kay. One makes that assumption. 

Senator Ben Nelson. I would think so. 

Dr. Kay. I also have to say that the people most likely to have 
been involved in this movement were the people in the intelligence 
services and around Uday and Qusay, and fortunately for the 
world, Uday and Qusay are no longer around to give evidence. A 
lot of those intelligence agents are either now dead or they're in op- 
position to the U.S. and not available for ISG. So there is a limited 
circle of people who probably had first-hand knowledge about mov- 
ing it, and here's how we get to irreducible uncertainty. They're 
d5ang, not soon enough in my view, but they are djdng. 

Senator Ben Nelson. Dr. Kay, I appreciate very much, as I say, 
your candor, and I totally agree with you that an outside body in- 
vestigating and looking into this intelligence credibility issue is im- 
portant. Certainly it's absolutely critical to the first track doctrine, 
which has to be on the basis of what you know, not what you think 
you know, and I appreciate your candor with respect to that as 
well. I'm certain that that's not always an easy thing to be able to 
take a position that strong, but I do appreciate that you've done 


Dr. Kay. Thank you. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator, for your participation. 

Senator Comyn. 

Senator Cornyn. Thank you. Dr. Kay, I too want to thank you 
for your service. I'm deeply concerned lest the politics of the mo- 
ment overshadow some important facts. First, would you agree that 
not only are intelligence agencies, but Democrats, Republicans, 
President Clinton, President Bush, France, (Jermany, Britain, all 
agreed that Saddam had stockpiles of WMD? 

Dr. Kay. I think that's true. 

Senator Cornyn. Until your report, after your long work with 
the ISG, have you found that anyone, any one of those people or 
groups that I've identified have in fact learned that it was not true, 
but nevertheless tried to manipulate it and present it as fact for 
some improper purpose? 

Dr. Kay. No, I know of no manipulation. I know of a lot of skep- 
ticism because it was such a widely-held view and wanting to know 
the facts, and I view that as absolutely appropriate. 

Senator CORNYN. So you know of no evidence, no indication that 
anyone tried to intentionally manipulate the intelligence that we 
got in order to justify going to war in Iraq? 

Dr. Kay. I've seen no evidence of that, nor have I seen any evi- 
dence after the fact of anyone trying to influence the conclusions 
that I or others are reaching as part of the ISG. 

Senator CORNYN. Let me just try to nail down a couple other 
facts. Although it now appears that Saddam, or at least so far ap- 
pears that Saddam did not have large stockpiles of WMD, he did 
continue research on chemical and biological and even nuclear 
weapons, correct? 

Dr. Kay. Absolutely. 

Senator CORNYN. Would you say then. Dr. Kay, that it was just 
a matter of time before Saddam would build such stockpiles or 
have that capability in a way that would threaten not only people 
in Iraq but people in that neighborhood and perhaps others? 

Dr. Kay. I think you will have, when you get the final ISG re- 
port, pretty compelling evidence that Saddam had the intention of 
continuing the pursuit of WMD when the opportunity arose, and 
that the first start on that, the long pole in the tent, was this re- 
start of the long-range missile program. 

Senator CORNYN. So that given time, these programs would have 
matured and Saddam would have been able to reconstitute his 
WMD arsenal? 

Dr. Kay. I hesitate. Senator, I think that's the safe assumption. 
What I don't know over time, and I'm more and more struck with, 
is how corrupt and destructive that society had become, but you 
can't count on when it would fall apart, and it might fall apart in 
ways that are far more dangerous, so I think that is the safe as- 

Senator Cornyn. You said something during your opening state- 
ment that intrigues me and something that I'm afraid may be over- 
looked in all of this back and forth, and that has to do with pro- 
liferation. You said that there was a risk of a willing seller meeting 
a willing buyer of such weapons or weapons stockpiles, whether 


they be large, small, or programs, whether it's information that 
Iraqi scientists might be willing to sell or work in cooperation with 
rogue organizations or even nations, but do you consider that to 
have been a real risk in terms of Saddam's activities and these pro- 
grams, the risk of proliferation? 

Dr. Kay. Actually, I consider it a bigger risk than the — and that's 
why I paused on the preceding question — I consider that a bigger 
risk than the restart of his programs being successful. I think the 
way the society was going and the number of willing buyers in the 
market, that probably was a risk that if we did avoid, we barely 

Senator CoRNYN. Indeed that continues to be a concern we have 
today in the old Soviet Union and other places where 

Dr. Kay. Pakistan. 

Senator Cornyn. Pakistan, other nations where they've had offi- 
cial weapons programs, biological, chemical, and nuclear, the risk 
of proliferation into the hands of terrorists like al Qaeda and oth- 
ers. Is that correct, sir? 

Dr. Kay. That's correct. 

Senator CoRNYN. Indeed, the deception that you've talked about 
of Saddam's own military and scientists and others who perhaps 
led him to believe that they were following through on his orders 
to develop these weapons of mass destruction, would you say that 
that deception not only convinced perhaps Saddam to some extent, 
but indeed that contributed to his intransigence before the world 
community and defiance of the United Nations and particularly fi- 
nally of U.N. Resolution 1441? 

Dr. Kay. I think that probably did. I'm just hesitant because ana- 
lyzing the mind of someone who would end up in a spider hole like 
Saddam requires a skill that I suspect I was not equipped for, but 
yes, I think that's a reasonable interpretation. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you very much, Dr. Kay, I appreciate it. 

Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator, very much. 

Senator Bill Nelson. 

Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kay, in the 
interview with the New York Times a few days ago, you had said, 
"I think that the system should have a way for an analyst to say, 
T don't have enough information to make a judgment.' There is 
really not a way to do that under the current system." 

The New York Times article goes on and this is what I want to 
ask you about. "He added," meaning you, "that while the analysts 
included caveats on their reports, those passages tended to drop off 
as the reports would go up the food chain inside the government." 
Tell me about that. How is that possible that in the Intelligence 
Community specifically when caveats are there about intelligence, 
that they get dropped off as it goes up the pecking order? 

Dr. Kay. Senator, when Jim Risen asked me about that, I gave 
him an example which he did not include in the article. I said writ- 
ing caveats has about the same intellectual enjoyment as being a 
writer for the National Geographic. I look at the pictures, I look at 
the captions. I confess, although I think we have in the basement 
probably a 20-year collection of National Geographies, I would be 
hard-pressed on a polygraph to say that I've ever read more than 
five of them. 


What happens is, it's not that they are physically removed. It's 
the higher up you go — just in your office, I suspect there are things 
that your staff passes up that you read the headlines of, you read 
the summary, you're busy, you have other things to do. Caveats 
tend to fall into footnotes, they tend to fall into smaller-point type. 
After all, they^re not what most people think, and you have just 
limited time and attention and it's a natural filtering phenomenon 
as opposed to a physical cutting. It's just one of those things, and 
look, I can point to myself as having been a consumer at points of 
intelligence, you like to believe that you fully read it and you 
search the caveats and you gave them the same attention that you 
give the dominant opinion. Very often you don't. There are just not 
that many hours in the day. 

Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Kay, I, along with 76 other Senators, 
voted for the resolution authorizing the President, the expenditure 
of funds for starting the war. I want to tell you some specific infor- 
mation that I was told by the Intelligence Community that has 
subsequently been made public by Secretary Powell in his speech 
to the United Nations. At the time it was highly classified and sub- 
sequently the administration declassified it and made it public. 

I haven't heard these comments from anybody else, but I was 
told not only did he have the weapons of mass destruction, and 
that he had the means to deliver them through unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs), but that he had the capability of transporting 
those UAVs outside of Iraq and threatening the homeland here in 
America, specifically by putting them on ships off the eastern sea- 
board, of which they would then drop their WMD on eastern sea- 
board cities. You can see all the more why I thought there was an 
imminent threat. Can you bring any light on this? 

Dr. Kay. Senator, what we have spent a great deal of time ex- 
ploring and it's still being explored is the UAV program. It was a 
very large UAV program and discoveries were being made really in 
the last 2 months with regard to that program. The Iraqis acknowl- 
edged that at least one of those families of UAVs was a direct de- 
scendant from an earlier one that had a spray tank on it. 

I think the judgment you will find, certainly it's — let me not 
judge what others will say — my judgment, having looked at that 
evidence of the UAV program, is that it was an active program, it's 
one of these program elements, WMD program elements that con- 
tinued. It was not at fruition. While it may have been theoretically 
possible that you could have snuck one of those on a ship off the 
East Coast off the United States that might have gotten, been able 
to deliver a small amount someplace, and that's certainly always 
possible, a good hobbyist could probably do it right now with off- 
the-shelf material here. I don't think there was the deployment ca- 
pability, the existing deplo3rment capability at that point for any 
sort of systematic military attack. 

But certainly as a terrorist action, who knows what he would 
have done. But we just did not discover — I mean, we discovered the 
UAVs and we discovered their development, and one of them is tied 
to a sprayer application, but it was not a strong point. 

Senator Bill Nelson. Dr. Kay, needless to say, I was absolutely 
told that that was a fact and I have subsequently found out, now 
after the fact, that there was a vigorous dispute in the Intelligence 


Community, and one part of the community said that was abso- 
lutely not true, and therefore you can see the chagrin with which 
I approach this discussion. 

Dr. Kay. I understand. Senator. 

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator. Colleagues, 
I take note that our distinguished witness has been under the scru- 
tiny of Congress since approximately 9:00 this morning when I first 
met with you in another setting and Senator Levin joined us at 
that setting. So I would suggest maybe just a few minutes and then 
we'll conclude what I believe has been a very thorough and broad- 
ranging series of questions and responses. Your responses are very 
forthright in my personal judgment. 

So, Senator Levin, if you'd like to start off, I'll wrap up. 

Senator Levin. Okay, thank you. Thank you again, Dr. Kay. Are 
you familiar with the Carnegie Endowment report? 

Dr. Kay. I'm familiar with it. Senator. I've not read it cover to 

Senator Levin. Let me read you just a portion of it then on page 
34. It has to do with the assessments before December 2001 and 
after December 2001. "Assessments prior to December 2001 had 
voiced concerns and warned of intentions to restart weapons pro- 
grams, but did not assert that any programs or weapons existed. 
Most were consistent with the 1998 intelligence report to Congress 
while UNSCOM inspectors were still in Iraq," and now I'm quoting 
that report, that 1998 report from this Carnegie report: "After 4 
years of denials, Iraq admitted to a defensive program resulting in 
the destruction of Al Hakam, a large biological warfare (BW) pro- 
duction facility Iraq was tr5ring to hide as a legitimate biological 
plant. Iraq still has not accounted for over 100 BW bombs and over 
80 percent of imported growth media directly related to future 
Iraqi production of thousands of gallons of biological agent. This 
lack of cooperation is an indication that Iraq intends to reconstitute 
its BW capability when possible." 

That's the assessment prior to 2001. After 2001, the assessment 
was they have biological weapons in their possession, not that they 
intend to reconstitute its BW capability when possible, which is the 
prior assessment, but that after 2001, after November 11, in effect, 
they have possession, inventories, stockpiles of weapons of mass de- 
struction. Do you see a difference between the before and after? 

Dr. Kay. Senator Levin, I don't think that is a fair — as my mem- 
ory, and I don't have the documents in front of me, I do not think 
that is a fair characterization of the intelligence reports and judg- 
ments prior to 2001. I refer you again, if you go back to Secretary 
Cohen's testimony before this committee. Secretary Cohen in the 
Clinton administration was not referring to anthrax that might be 
reconstituted, produced in some reconstituted program, he was re- 
ferring to actual weapons. 

Senator Levin. Which Iraq had at what point? We've gone back 
to at least look at his — the part that we're able to get on Secretary 
Cohen, which was an interview on a TV station. 

Dr. Kay. But there was also testimony. 

Senator Levin. It seems from this he's talking about what they 
had in the early 1990s and what we caught him with and what 
that can do, what that anthrax can do and what they destroyed. 


that's what he was talking about in that interview. Are you saying 
he came before this committee? 

Dr. Kay. My memory is it was this committee. It may not have 
been this committee. 

Senator Levin. But you're saying that Secretary Cohen said, in 
our judgment, they have anthrax, they are producing anthrax, and 
here, this bag of 5 pounds is what they can do? That's what you're 
sa5ring today? 

Dr. Kay. My memory is that in holding that 5-pound bag and 
talking about how much destruction that could do, he made ref- 
erence to Iraq having those capabilities. 

Senator Levin. Currently? 

Dr. Kay. That's my memory, sir, but you have the record, you 
have a staff behind you, I don't. 

Senator Levin. We'll check it, because it's pretty important be- 
cause you're saying that Secretary Cohen said that they — the same 
thing basically as we were told immediately prior to the attack on 
Iraq, which is that they had possession of BW weapons and here's 
what 5 pounds can do. I'm not sa5dng he didn't say that, by the 
way. I'm going to go back and check too. But you're now saying 
that we better check the record before 

Dr. Kay. I'm saying that my memory is that that's what he said, 
but I always believe in checking the record. 

Senator Levin. Okay. We will surely do that to see if your mem- 
ory's correct. But let me then also read to you something from the 
assessments on the BW. This is the report, this is the last Clinton 
administration report for the period January to June 2000 on BW, 
and I'm going to read you this paragraph and then I'm going to 
read you the report for the period of January to June by the Bush 
administration and I want to see if you think they're the same. 

Here's what the last Clinton administration report said: "In 
1995, Iraq admitted to having an offensive BW program and sub- 
mitted the first in a series of full, final, and complete disclosures 
that were supposed to reveal the full scope of its BW program. Ac- 
cording to UNSCOM, these disclosures are incomplete and filled 
with inaccuracies. Since the full scope and nature of Iraq's BW pro- 
gram was not verified, UNSCOM assessed that Iraq continues to 
maintain a knowledge base and industrial infrastructure that could 
be used to produce quickly a large amount of BW agents at any 
time if needed." 

Knowledge base and infrastructure that could be used to 
produce — now this is the report for the period January to June 
2002 of the Bush administration. During this reporting period, 
Baghdad continued to pursue a BW program. Continued to pursue 
a program. Do you consider those words to be the same as continu- 
ing to maintain a knowledge base and an industrial infrastructure 
that could be used to produce? You consider those to be the same 

Dr. Kay. I'm not sure they're terribly different. 

Senator Levin. Are they somewhat different? 

Dr. Kay. They're somewhat different. Quite frankly, your mem- 
ory is better than mine. I'm not sure that is the total scope of what 
the Clinton administration had on the biological program at that 
point. I remember a more voluminous statement about it. 


Senator Levin. It is, it's far more. I'm tr5dng to obviously — be- 
cause you can't quote the entire — to pick out representative parts. 

Dr. Kay. I understand that, but in judging similarities and accu- 
racies, selection is always a danger in any field. 

Senator Levin. It is, I agree, by anybody that attempts to com- 
municate that's always a problem. 

Dr. Kay. Absolutely. 

Senator Levin. But what I would like you to do then, because 
you've made a representation here that these were the same as- 
sessments that were made by both the Clinton intelligence folks, 
and the Bush intelligence folks, that you go back and see whether 
or not in fact that is accurate. 

I've given you quotes and I can continue to show differences. The 
Carnegie report shows significant differences between intelligence. 
It's not so much Clinton/Bush, it's prior to September 11, after Sep- 
tember 11. That's the key thing when intelligence at that point 
changed significantly in the analysis of the Carnegie folks. I would 
think that, since you're making a statement that it didn't, that you 
take a look at at least their assessment and the documentation 
that they provide that shows the significant shift in intelligence be- 
fore and after September 11. Are you willing to do that? 

Dr. Kay. Senator Levin, I'm always happy to take homework as- 
signments from you. I hope it comes with an address for one of 
those undisclosed locations. Quite frankly, after I get out of here, 
I'm going to tell Senator Warner I'm disappearing to an undis- 
closed location for a couple of weeks. 

Senator Levin. You're entitled to it. 

Dr. Kay. But I certainly will do that. It's a point well taken. 

Senator Levin. You're very much entitled to it. One other com- 
ment here. People have talked about France, Russia, and every- 
body else. This is a quote from Chirac, I don't know whether this 
is representative or not: "I have no evidence that these weapons 
exist in Iraq," Chirac said. "U.S. officials, however, say they are 
certain that Iraq has the weapons and insists that it must turn 
them over for destruction or face war." That's what his quote is in 
The Washington Post in February 2003. Now, maybe you have 
other information. 

Dr. Kay. There are other quotes from the French and from 

Senator Levin. Where Chirac says they do have weapons? 

Dr. Kay. Yes. 

Senator Levin. Okay. That's just one quote. Russia, however, 
said that they did not have, or that they had not seen undeniable 
proof of Iraqi arms programs or terrorist ties. That's a quote we 
have in the Associated Press, maybe that's not accurate or rep- 
resentative. Do you know whether Russia 

Dr. Kay. I don't — the Russian intelligence I don't have on the tip 
of my tongue unless 

Senator Levin. All right. Have you been asked by the intel- 
ligence, by the CIA, for whom you were working until a week ago, 
I believe, whenever. 

Dr. Kay. That's correct. 

Senator Levin. Have you been asked to give a final report of 
your views? 


Dr. Kay. I did a final briefing out for the DDCI and the DCI of 
what I found. It was an oral briefing. It lasted a substantial portion 
of a day. I think they fully understand what I concluded in my re- 
port at that point, yes. 

Senator Levin. Do you know whether or not they made notes of 
your briefing? 

Dr. Kay. There were note-takers in the room but I don't know 

Senator Levin. I think we either, and it's not up to me, I'm not 
the chairman, but it seems to me it's important for the history and 
for the future that we have your views in a formal report. You 
didn't give us written testimony today, it was just a couple days 
that you had the invitation of the chairman to come here, so I'm 
not at all critical, by the way, of that, believe me. I'm not critical 
of the chairman, I'm not critical of you, either one. I'm glad you're 

But I do think it's important that we get your views, in some 
kind of a formal, cohesive way because they're valuable to us, we've 
obviously followed your views very carefully, the country has. It 
seems to me in these circumstances that you should put, the way 
you want to say it, your views, for the record, for the Nation, for 
us, even though we're not in the middle of an inquiry in this com- 
mittee, I wish we were frankly but we're not, I'm trying to do the 
best I can as ranking member, but the Intelligence Committee is, 
so perhaps they would ask you. I can't ask on behalf of Senator 
Roberts either. 

But in any event, if asked, by either our chairman or by Senator 
Roberts, would you be willing to provide your final report, on the 
way out? 

Dr. Kay. If asked by those two Senators, and certainly the senior 
Senator from the Commonwealth of Virginia where I live, my gen- 
eral policy, as I told Senator Warner when he asked me to appear 
here, is never to say no to Senator Warner. There may a point in 
my life when I decide that's unwise, but I have not reached that 
point yet. 

Senator Levin. Most of us are in the same position. We don't say 
no to Senator Warner as a matter of fact. Okay, that's then up to 
those two Senators 

Chairman WARNER. I think that you raise an interesting point 
and I've given it some consideration and I will discuss it with our 
distinguished witness, but it seems to me it could well be done in 
the context of your commenting on the next interim report that 
would be forthcoming. 

Dr. Kay. I leave it to you. 

Senator Levin. One other question that I would hope the chair- 
man would take under advisement. That is that we ask the CIA 
if they have taken notes of a day-long debrief that they share those 
notes with us. Your comments here obviously are significant, your 
comments here period. Your statement in the New York Times ha? 
been read by, I'm sure, not just millions of New York Times read- 
ers but by every member of this committee and their staff, probably 
more than once. That's how significant those views are, so I would 
think that we ought to take full advantage at least of the notes of 
the CIA at a minimum that they took of a day-long debrief. 


Again, I close with my statement of thanks for your wiUingness 
to come as a private citizen and to share your opinions with the 
committee and with the Nation. 

Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Levin. Do you have any 
final comment? I would simply ask one last question. I think there 
may be an omission in the record that should be plugged. Any evi- 
dence with regard to participation by either Saddam Hussein or his 
principal henchmen in the WMD sharing with al Qaeda or any 
other terrorist organizations? 

Dr. Kay. There's no evidence that I can think of that I know of. 
This was obviously an investigative target. There may well have 
been evidence produced since I left or will be by the time of the 
March — it's certainly something that has a great deal of attention. 

Chairman WARNER. Thank you. The hearing will now be con- 
cluded with my, again, expression of appreciation to you and your 
very lovely wife, who made it possible for you to be here today. 

Dr. Kay. Thank you very much. I'll convey that. 

Chairman WARNER. We are adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

Questions Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd 
iraq survey group funds 

1. Senator Byrd. Dr. Kay, Congress has appropriated very large sums of money 
to the search for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. In April 2003, Congress appro- 
priated $300 million for the search, and in November 2003, Congress approved an- 
other substantial amount of funds, the exact amount of which is classified. How 
much of these funds have been spent to date? 

Dr. Kay. As I have now left U.S. Government service, I no longer have access to 
financial data for the ISG and this question should be directed to the Department 
of Defense as the agency that controlled ISG finances. 

2. Senator Byrd. Dr. Kay, do you have any estimate of how much it will take to 
complete the ISG's mission later this year? 

Dr. Kay. The question of how much time will be required to complete ISG's mis- 
sion depends upon what that mission is, the resources that will be made available 
for that mission/missions, and the security environment within Iraq which greatly 
impacts the pace of ISG's work. 

3. Senator Byrd. Dr. Kay, you have said that the work of the ISG is about 85 
percent complete. Does the ISG still require that huge amount of funds if its work 
is so close to completion? 

Dr. Kay. I believe that about 85 percent of the work necessary to understand the 
status of Iraq's WMD programs at the time of the war, and particularly to answer 
the question as to whether they had large stockpiles of WMD, has been carried out. 
I do not believe that completing that work will require "huge" amounts of funds, 
but a deterioration of the security environment in Iraq and any greater use of con- 
tractor personnel to replace the Government employees used during my period in 
Iraq could substantially increase the cost. 

4. Senator Byrd. Dr. Kay, you spoke at today's hearing about the diversion of per- 
sonnel away from the ISG to purposes not closely related to the search for weapons 
of mass destruction. Do you believe that funds have been, or will be, diverted fi-om 
the ISG to carry out activities unrelated to its charter? 

Dr. Kay. As the charter of the ISG has been changed from when I took over in 
June, I believe that any diversion of funds will be related to the new charter of ISG 
as promulgated by the Department of Defense. 

[Whereupon, at 1:49 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 



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